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The object of this thesis is to ascertain what was the most significant factor in 
determining support for Gaullism in unoccupied France. The first aim of this dissertation 
is to study the ways in which the Mers-el-Kebir incident affected de Gaulle's movement. 
The second aim is to examine the influence of other aspects on Gaullism, such as the 
origins and organisation of the Free French movement, the propaganda and policies of the 
Vichy regime, the opinions of the French Resistance, and other external influences such 
as American, British and Russian foreign policy. 
This thesis will try to offer some conclusions as to if, why and when de Gaulle and the 
Free French movement became popular in France. It will also compare the reasons for his 
popularity and unpopularity and rate them against the effect of the Mers-el-Kebir incident 
as well as determining whether the extent of his support was beyond his control or was 
due to his own actions. 
For my parents Robert and Dianne and my grandparents 
Alec, Robert and Florence 
This thesis is dedicated to the memory of my grandmother, 
May Collison (1924 - 2000) 
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Introduction 
One of the most controversial aspects ofthe Second World War, the occupation of France and French 
public opinion during that time, has been shrouded in rumours and mystery. For thirty years, myths have 
been created to bolster the renewed support of 'Petainisme' and to justify the 'greatness' that is Gaullism. 
Each myth has succeeded in further obscuring fact from fiction. Each myth has supported a political 
grouping intent on obtaining political power and influence in post-war France. For fifty years, rumours 
have abounded over whether Marshal Philippe Petain or General Charles de Gaulle was the true French 
resister and whether de Gaulle's hatred for the Vichy government was insincere 1. By disentangling post-
war opinions of authors, historians and politicians, we may fmd out what really happened and what was 
really going through the minds' of French people at that time. 
In 1940, the whole world was in turmoil during which France was occupied and suffered a very 
unnatural existence. The speed and completeness of their defeat and the manner in which they were 
governed and occupied had neyer been experienced by the French nation before. Nor had Europe 
experienced a war like it. 'In the streets of Paris and the other cities and towns of France there was no 
shouting when war came' 2. The people of France did not understand why they were going to war. Another 
blood bath like the Great War haunted people's minds. Furthermore, would they not 'lose' the peace again 
like in 1919? Public opinion w~s neither determined nor indifferent, neither pacifist nor patriotic. To sum it 
up, Andre Beaufre said, 'the nation went to war looking over its shoulder, its eyes seeking for peace' 3 . 
James McMillan believed theit inactivity came from a false sense of security, such as the Maginot Line, 
rather than from fear or defeatism4. Complacency and lassitude became endemic. Petain, 'in his great age, 
epitomised the paralysis of the French people' 5• The grave demographic situation gave the French people a 
strong desire to save French liyes whenever possible. 
After the defeat in June 1940, France seemed to take a backseat in the proceedings. On 3 July 1940, the 
British attack on the French Fleet at Mers-el-Kebir took place. It was seen as a necessity by the British 
1 Pro-Petain feeling in Rem~ Benjamin~ Le Marechal du Peuple (Paris, 1944) and pro-de Gaulle feeling in Colonel Passy, Souvenirs 
Tome I et Tome 11 (Monte Carlo, 1947). 
2 William L. Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (London, 1970), p.490. 
3 Andre Beaufre, 1940: The Fall of France (London, 1967), p.39. 
4 James F. McMillan, Twentieth-Cent~ry France (New York, 1997), p.l24. 
5 Major-General Spears quoted in Colin Dyer, Population and Societv in Twentieth-Century France (Suffolk, 1978), p.l03. 
Government and was therefore carried out without much protest. It sent shockwaves around the globe, not 
least to France where Anglophobic sentiment struck home. The Petain Government propaganda machine 
wasted no time in filling newspapers and posters with anti-British and anti-de Gaulle slogans. On 7 July 
1940, in 'Journal des De bats', one article stated, 'C'est plus qu'un crime, ... c'est une extraordinaire faute 
dont les consequences sont incalculables' 6. However, what seemed ominous to the French was that the 
British would be defeated soon and that their only hope lay in the Victor ofVerdun, Marshal Petain. 
The Mers-el-Kebir incident or 'tragedie' as it was and is known in France posed an early threat to the 
existence of the newly-founded Free French organisation. The first aim of this dissertation is to study the 
ways in which the Mers-el-Kebir incident threatened de Gaulle's movement. It is necessary to analyse its 
effect on recruitment to de Gaulle's movement, how it affected French public opinion, how the Vichy 
government was affected by it and what action they took against the aggression, and what the home 
resistance movements' views were on it. It will also be important to look at the anti-British and anti-de 
Gaulle propaganda which sprung up soon after the incident occurred. Other aspects of this incident in 
relation to the support for Gaullism include how the significance of a vehement anti-British policy affected 
the de Gaulle movement, how people responded to de Gaulle's speech on the eighth of July, and also how 
people evaluated the way in which de Gaulle dealt with the British after the Mers-el-Kebir incident. 
We need to consider the following question:- Who did the French blame for the Mers-el-Kebir incident? 
We must contemplate whether the incident was looked upon as solely the fault of the British, or the fault of 
both the British and the Gaullists, or otherwise. The answer depends on how the French perceived de 
Gaulle at that time. The effects of the Mers-el-Kebir incident will form the first chapter. 
The second aim ofthis dissertation is to compare the influence of the Mers-el-Kebir incident with other 
aspects that contributed to or reduced the support for Gaullism in Unoccupied France in order to understand 
how influential the British attack was in the overall scope of things. The focus in the second chapter will be 
on the personality of de Gaulle, his Free French movement, how de Gaulle's own personality and political 
views may have been a factor, and how some rumours and theories may have misconstrued fact from 
fiction and therefore coloured people's opinions of de Gaulle and his movement. Also, an examination of 
the Free French movement itself will be very helpful as will de Gaulle's relations with his allies. An 
6 Journal des Debats (Clermont-Ferrand, 7 July I 940), p. I. 
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analysis will follow how the Vichy regime and especially Petain may have affected the influence and 
support ofGaullism in Unoccupied France. To search for a consensus will not be an easy undertaking. All 
of these influential aspects must be compared with the importance ofMers-el-Kebir and evaluated in terms 
of how significant each aspect was to the support of de Gaulle in France. 
There are many subsidiary factors that need to be reviewed in this dissertation. One of these factors is the 
British and their effect on de Gaulle's popularity in France. The British undertook actions that were very 
unpopular but deemed necessary by Winston Churchill and his government. They also supported de Gaulle 
and his movement in monetary and moral terms. An evaluation must be made about whether the British did 
affect Gaullist support in France and if so, in what way did they influence French public opinion? We must 
also examine the role of the British intelligence network and to look at relations between the United States 
and Russian governments and the Free French. This will form a chapter on external influences affecting 
support for Gaullism. 
Another subsidiary factor is the French Home Resistance. There were various groups and movements, all 
of which possessed different aims and political views. In order to understand if and how the Resistance 
movements accepted the authority and leadership of de Gaulle and the Free French movement, and whether 
this influenced the nation's beliefs, it is necessary to compare their aims and objectives, to discover how 
fast news travelled of de Gaulle's exile in London, and to summarise how Communist strength from 1941 
affected de Gaulle's support in France. The circumstances of the French Communist Party illustrate to us 
the different political groupings and how they transpired into resistance movements. They also show us that 
there was another strong contender for head of the French Resistance: -the Communists even thought of 
themselves as the sole resisters of France. We have not yet touched the surface of how different the many 
resistance organisations were. However, due to the reluctance of many former resisters to tell their story, it 
would seem that time is not on the historians' side. The resistance organisations are important to this 
investigation because they do mirror public opinion somewhat or at least provide a growing trend of public 
opinion in France. Their influence will form the basis of a later chapter. 
A further subsidiary factor is the mentality of people living in the Unoccupied zone from 1940 to 1942. 
The conditions that people lived in, the extent of feeling occupied and the support for the Vichy 
Government were very different between the Occupied zone and the Unoccupied zone. These differences 
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led to a divergence of opinion between the zones. The people in the unoccupied zone had less to complain 
about and could do more as they pleased. The southern resistance organisations reflect this. To determine 
how popular de Gaulle was in the Unoccupied zone, the final chapter will analyse French opinion in that 
zone with regard to de Gaulle, the other resistance movements, and of course the Vichy Government. To 
understand the extent of support for de Gaulle, one must understand the moral and mental attitudes of 
French people at that time. 
All myths have a certain perception of what the words 'resistance' and 'collaboration' mean. If 'armchair 
resisters' are part of the Resistance, then the membership is more substantial. If collaboration only means 
dealing directly with Germans, then this group is very small. There are quite a few questions one must 
answer before looking into the extent of Gaullist support in France. The ideas that myths create will 
become an integral part of this analysis. Once one has defined what these words mean, one can understand 
how much support de Gaulle actually attained in Unoccupied France and also how popular the Vichy 
Government were during their early period in office. 
When de Gaulle wrote his three-volume 'Memoires de Guerre' in the 1950's, few opposed what he had 
written perhaps, through guilt or through inactivity. Not enough clear evidence was available to discount 
some of the things that de Gaulle claimed. Even now, sixty years after the fall of France, we are no closer 
to knowing the truth about certain aspects of Vichy France. Most of the Vichy government's records are 
still unavailable and many important documents either did not exist in the first place or have been lost 
forever. French resisters and collaborators have been very reluctant to come forward to tell their story 
owing usually to the political situation in France at the time. Their secrecy, a survival technique during the 
war, has remained with them. Unfortunately, there is not a sufficiently large sample of witnesses to provide 
us with a fair view of what happened and what people felt during the occupation, especially for the period 
up until late 1942 when France was totally occupied. Furthermore, when these people are interviewed, they 
are asked more questions about Petain and the Vichy Government and less about what they thought of the 
Free French movement. 
Most post-war historians have concentrated less on de Gaulle and the Free French movement and written 
more on the controversies of Vichy collaboration and anti-Semitic policies. Historians such as Robert 
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Paxton, Henri Rousso, Jean-Pierre Azema and Philippe Burrin have contributed to the revisionism of Vichy 
French history. They have uncovered evidence which had previously been concealed or forgotten aboue. 
Owing to a variety of myths and post-Resistance analyses, there has been a great deal of misleading 
information over the last fifty years. Due to the 'Gaullist resistancialist myth' 8, the issue of support for 
Gaullism in Unoccupied France has not been effectively researched. Many have presented critiques of de 
Gaulle such as Admiral Muselier who wrote how de Gaulle used people and as a consequence did 
irreparable damage to the Free French Movement9. Others have written books to further their own career 
such as Georges Bidault who later wrote acidly about de Gaulle, 'When a man is in exile like de Gaulle, 
even when he is not an outlaw in his own country, he sees men and events only from a distance, so that he 
makes errors ofjudgement' 10. Many have written hagiographic 'de Gaulliana' such as Aidan Crawley who 
seems to be in awe of de Gaulle and his past triumphs 11 . In the past, some French people believed that they 
lived in a nation of resisters and that de Gaulle had always been popular as 'Lorraine', the organ of 
Fighting France, would have us believe in October 1942:- 'Son chef, le general de Gaulle, est acclame par 
tous les Fram;ais' 12• Only recently, with de Gaulle's demise and recent biographies, has the record been set 
straight. Historians such as Andrew Shennan and Jean Lacouture have re-examined the career of de Gaulle 
and provided a revisionist approach to the 'Gaullist resistancialist myth'. They have tried to find a balanced 
medium between Gaullist and Vichy propaganda13 . This is the approach that will be followed in this thesis. 
Material on public opinion in France and especially on people's feelings for de Gaulle and the Free 
French is not too easy to discover. One of the better and later accounts of public opinion in France is Pierre 
Laborie's 'L'Opinion Fran~aise sous Vichy' (1990) which is very extensive in its research, but relies rather 
too heavily on providing evidence from only two regions in France. Other recent and important works of 
synthesis include John F. Sweets 'Choices in Vichy France' (1986) and Jean-Pierre Azema's 'From 
7 Robert 0. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order. 1940-1944 (London and New York, 1975), Henri Rousso, The Vichy 
Syndrome: History and Memory in France since 1944 (London and Massachusetts, 1996; trans. Arthur Goldhammer), Jean-Pierre 
Azema, From Munich to the Liberation. 1938-1944 (Cambridge, 1984), and Philippe Burrin, Living with Defeat France under the 
German Occupation 1940-1944 (London, 1996). 
8 Rousso, The Vichy Syndrome, p.l8. 
9 Vice-Admiral Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme (Paris, 1946). A contemporary example is Stephane Zagdanski, Poor de 
Gaulle (2000). 
10 Georges Bidault, Resistance: A Political Autobiography (London, 1967; trans. Marianne Sinclair), p.5. 
11 Aidan Crawley, De Gaulle: A Biography (London, 1969), pp. 136, 186,203 and 472. 
12 Lorraine (Lorraine, October 1942), p.l. 
13 Refer to Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebell890-1944 (New York and London, 1984; trans. Patrick O'Brian, 1990) and Andrew 
Shennan, De Gaulle (London and New York, 1993). 
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Munich to the Liberation, 1938-1944' (1984). Furthermore, H.R. Kedward has recently reassessed the 
French resistance and shed new light on their feelings and opinions owing to his innumerable interviews 
with ex-resisters 14• Apart from the lack of information on public opinion in France, there is also a distinct 
lack of secondary sources on the differences between people's views in the occupied zone and their views 
in the unoccupied zone. 
Primary and secondary sources are growing considerably in number and are providing us with a wealth 
of information about the period in question, but owing to the considerable differences between French 
people who share the same general political views, it is very difficult to gauge how anti-de Gaulle or pro-
Petain a movement was by reading one of its member's memoirs. What we must understand is that every 
piece of academic work about people's opinions and feelings has to be generalised in order for it to be 
written. Furthermore, the people who expressed their views after the war are probably the people who tried 
to influence others during the war. Therefore, where there is one view, there are most probably a group of 
supporters who expressed that view as their own. We must come to terms with political climates to 
understand why someone may have become increasingly pro-Petain, and we must balance out the 
exaggerated myths of de Gaulle and the propaganda for the Vichy regime and German occupiers to 
determine the truth. 
After deciphering fact from fiction within selected primary and secondary sources and examining all the 
influential factors, an evaluation will be made about the extent of Gaullist support in Unoccupied France 
and the effect of the Mers-el-Kebir incident on de Gaulle's popularity in Unoccupied France. Furthermore, 
Mers-el-Kebir will be set in context with all of the other factors affecting de Gaulle's support in France and 
a comparison will be made. By studying all of the hindrances and benefits to Gaullism in the Unoccupied 
zone, we will better understand the effect the early incident ofMers-el-Kebir had on the Gaullist movement 
and its support base in Vichy France. It is not impossible that the incident of July 1940 was of some benefit 
to de Gaulle. Answers may be gleaned from people's thoughts at the time as well as the effect that negative 
propaganda had on people in the Unoccupied zone. 
The main aims of this dissertation are to better understand the relationship between the Mers-el-Kebir 
incident and the support for Gaullism in Vichy France and to consider how much support de Gaulle had 
14 H.R. Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France: A Study of Ideas and Motivation in the Southern Zone 1940-42 (Oxford, 1978). 
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attained in southern France by November 1942 when the Germans occupied the whole country; and the part 
the Mers-el-Kebir incident and other factors played in this. Another objective is to determine whether the 
extent ofGaullist support was due to de Gaulle's own actions or due to external events beyond his control. 
The fmal objective is to determine what was the most significant influence on support for Gaullism. This 
dissertation is not an attempt to lay all the blame for de Gaulle's misfortunes or otherwise on Mers-el-
Kebir, nor is it an attempt to crucify the myth of de Gaulle. That critique has been written too many times 
before. It is simply an exercise in establishing fact over fiction and hopefully bringing new evidence to 
light. 
At present, there seems to be no definitive work based purely on the support for de Gaulle in Unoccupied 
France. In this sense, this dissertation aspires to be part of a hypothesised 'defmitive work'. 
7 
Mers-ei-Kebir as a factor in the popularity of the Gaullists in Unoccupied 
France. 
The French Atlantic Squadron, 'Raid Force', comprised about twenty per cent of the total French Fleet 
including the 'Dunkerque', 'Strasbourg', 'Provence' and 'Bretagne'. Most were anchored too close 
together by the harbour at Mer-el-Kebir, near Oran on the north coast of Algeria, to put up any kind of 
effective defence. During the night of2-3 July 1940, the infinitely superior 'Force H' of the Royal Navy 
began laying magnetic mines to trap the French ships in port. The following morning at 7.05am the British 
Captain Holland handed an ultimatum to Vice-Admiral Marcel Gensoul, Commander-in-Chief of the 
'Force du Raid'. There were four options given to the French:- (a) Sail with the British and continue to 
fight against the Axis Powers, (b) Sail with reduced crews to a British port and the reduced crews would be 
repatriated, (c) Sail with reduced crews to the neutrality of the West In dies (e.g. Martinique ), or (d) the 
British would demand that the French sink their own ships. If the French failed to agree to any of these 
options, then the British would use force against the French Fleet. Gensoul informed the French Admiralty 
about most of the ultimatum but did not mention the Martinique alternative and implied that the British had 
said, "Sink your ships or we'll use force!" 15 The Admiralty, of course, told him to resist. 
The first salvo hit the French ships at 4.57pm. The fleet was caught in a trap, it was shelled at point blank 
range by the British and could not manoeuvre effectively. Without being able to reply, the French Fleet was 
destroyed in thirteen minutes. Only the 'Strasbourg', 'Volga', 'Terrible' and 'Tigre' somehow escaped to 
reach the French port ofToulon the following day. The 'Provence' and 'Dunkerque' ran aground and the 
'Bretagne' was blown up and capsized. Only the aircraft carrier 'Commandant-Teste' remained unscathed. 
The dead were buried on the 5 July. After Admiral Esteva's message on the 6th that the 'Dunkerque' was 
only slightly damaged, the British bombers returned to finish her off. They sank a tug and trawler, the 
'Esterel' and 'Terre-Neuve' respectively, and left a hole in the side of the 'Dunkerque' the blast from 
which had killed one hundred and fifty-four men. The total French casualties were one thousand, two 
hundred and ninety-seven; three hundred and fifty-one were wounded. 
15 The Times, 'The French Nation Deceived' (London, 9 July 1940), p.4. 
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Mers-el-Kebir was part of 'Operation Catapult' organised by the British as a matter of self-preservation. 
On the 3 July, the British seized French warships and merchant ships without warning in the ports of 
Plymouth, Portsmouth and Southampton. The French Fleet in Alexandria agreed to disarm and were 
blocked in that port. Finally, the battle-cruiser 'Richelieu' was bombarded at Dakar on 8 July. These acts 
gave rise to serious consequences for de Gaulle and the British, but by far the most traumatic and shocking 
incident took place at Mers-el-Kebir. It was Mers-el-Kebir that immediately influenced opinion in the 
French free zone. It was the loss of so many French lives in such a short time that so greatly affected the 
French people. 
When de Gaulle left France for London in June 1940, he faced a great many crises including his 
problems of being accepted and recognised by the British Government, the lack of response to his 'appel' 
of 18 June, his own misgivings about the task that he had undertaken, and his fear for the safety of his 
family. All of these crises paled by comparison when the Mers-el-Kebir affair threatened to destroy de 
Gaulle and the fledgling Free French Movement. From whence he came, de Gaulle would have to instil 
faith in himself and his movement in order for the population to support them at the Liberation. Further 
south, in the unoccupied zone, he faced a tougher challenge. 
Between 1940 and 1942, the French population living in the unoccupied or 'free' zone never forgot the 
Mers-el-Kebir incident. They were a very harsh audience and became set in their ways only a few weeks 
after the Armistice. Towards 1942, the unoccupied zone became the Gaullists' target market and their 
popularity partly depended on how well people had taken the Mers-el-Kebir incident. 
This set of circumstances would never have materialised if the Mers-el-Kebir incident had strangled the 
Free French movement at birth. Aidan Crawley suggests that the 'tragedie' was 'a blow ... which ... nearly 
put an end to the whole of the Free French movement' 16• It was a sudden blow to their reputation in native 
Frenchmen's eyes. Internally, it caused a great deal of upheaval. The French Embassy became more aloof 
than ever towards the Gaullists, not willing to associate with a pro-British element. The work of the Free 
French was seriously disrupted by the incident. Admiral Muselier felt that he could not continue his plans 
for a Franco-British naval agreement17• 
16 Crawley, De Gaulle, p.l24. 
17 Dorothy S. White, Seeds of Discord: De Gaulle, the Free French and the Allies (New York, 1964), p.86. 
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'Charles de Gaulle was hit very hard by the "terrible axe-blow" ofMers-el-Kebir,I 8. The loss oflife 
greatly affected him because of the fact that it seemed like such a waste and that the French Navy had not 
really died in battle but had been massacred in a cowardly fashion. Furthermore, it came at a very 
unfortunate moment, not just for de Gaulle but also for the French people who were theoretically about to 
choose who would lead them during the occupation. On the 4 July, 'de Gaulle had calmed down, and had 
recognised that the operation, however painful, had been inevitable. But he was depressed about the longer-
term effects and thought that he might give up the struggle and retire to private life in Canada. It was the 
first time that de Gaulle had become profoundly disheartened'. Charles Williams has stated that the positive 
reaction of the British people to de Gaulle and his Free French movement influenced de Gaulle's decision 
to stay on in London. He was the bedrock of the movement. It is difficult to imagine the Free French 
movement continuing without the leadership of de Gaulle 19. 
De Gaulle and the Free French movement suffered a severe blow to their recruitment of French soldiers 
and sailors. Naval recruitment had not got off to a good start anyway but soon dried up after the Mers-el-
Kebir affair. Of a total of five hundred officers and eighteen thousand sailors who were stationed in 
England by June 1940, only fifty French naval officers and two hundred sailors chose to stay with de 
Gaulle20, although hundreds of sailors opted for service with the British Navy. On the 30 June 1940, Vice-
Admiral Muselier was given command of the Free French Navy and issued an optimistic order to rally the 
French sailors on 1 July. The effect of this 'ralliement' can only be a matter of conjecture now. A number 
of ships had recently rallied to the Gaullist cause. Now no more came. Eight months later, there were only 
about forty operational warships, 'while the merchant shipping under the Free French Flag totaled 170 
ships and 700,000 tons in all. As for the air force, it was not until the spring of 1941 that independent units 
could be formed, though many French pilots had fought with the Royal Air Force before then' 21 . 
Furthermore by mid-August 1940, the Free French Army only consisted of two thousand two hundred and 
fifty officers and soldiers22 . According to Robert Paxton, the sum total of the Gaullist movement in July 
1940 amounted to only seven thousand and from the end of 1940 until November 1942, it was 
18 Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, p.248. 
19 Charles Williams, The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General de Gaulle (London, 1993), p.l20. 
20 Paxton Vichy France, p.44. 
21 A. Hartley Gaullism: The Rise and Fall of a Political Movement (London, 1970), p.59. 
22 Williams The Last Great Frenchman, p.l25. 
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approximately thirty-five thousand. Many men changed their minds about fleeing to join de Gaulle in 
London. Most of the future Gaullists would not make their commitment for years to come. 'Genuine 
"resisters of the first hour" were a rare breed indeed in 1940'23 . Both de Gaulle and Muselier knew that 
without adequate numbers of soldiers and sailors, the Free French movement would not be taken seriously 
in Unoccupied France24 . Few people believed in the cause for which de Gaulle stood, and fewer still were 
prepared to acknowledge him as their leader25 . 
The Mers-el-Kebir tragedy was not the only reason for a drop in recruitment but it proved to be the major 
reason for the dwindling numbers; 'Operation Catapult' as a whole was a devastating blow to de Gaulle and 
the Free French. The capture of the French naval ships at Alexandria and in British ports further 
exacerbated the situation of the southern French, as did the later attacks on the 'Dunkerque' at Dakar. 
However, as we shall discover in later chapters, the British and de Gaulle himself hampered the recruitment 
effort. 
Unfortunately, most people in the unoccupied zone received news of de Gaulle and Mers-el-Kebir 
through French radio and newspapers, and these were already under the scrutiny of government censors. 
The Vichy Government made the most of the affair in the propaganda war. Their anti-de Gaulle and anti-
British propaganda grew in abundance. Firstly, there was the publication on 7 July of the numbers of 
French casualties at Mers-el-Kebir on 3 and 6 July. Then, the film of the cemetery at Mers-el-Kebir with its 
1,200-odd graves and crosses was often shown on the screen in France26, and on 3 July 1941 a memorial 
service was held throughout France to commemorate the 'martyrs'. An example of this propaganda appears 
on page twelve. They were determined to use the affair as much as possible to discredit de Gaulle and his 
Free French. However, there is the famous saying that 'any publicity is good publicity'. The French Navy 
remained embittered and were assisted in this by constant reminders of the affair. It acted as a spur to the 
resistance at Dakar in September 1940 and in Syria the following year, and it may have even accounted for 
the French naval resistance during the Allies' North African Landings in November 1942. The French were 
23 Paxton, Vichy France, p.44. 
24 Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre 1: L'Appel1940-1942 (Paris, 1954), p.78 and Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, 
p.20. 
25 FO 371 28270 1941 France File No.45 Z2846 Mr. Savery (British Embassy to Poland) to Mr. Roberts (09/04/41) 'A Summary 
(March 1941) by Polish diplomat living in unoccupied France since the defeat, M. Cajetan Morawski'. 
26 FO 371 24321 1940 France File No.890 C9042 Telegram from Consul Livingstone (Geneva, 24 August 1940). 
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encouraged to protect their territory by the Germans who, as part of the propaganda machine, allowed for 
the suspension of Article Eight. On 4 July, AdolfHitler allowed the French to keep their ships in full 
commission with full ammunition and fuel. 
Later reports suggest that the Vichy Government and Nazi Germans' use of propaganda was very 
effective. In the Foreign Office records currently held at the Public Record Office in London, regular 
reports were forwarded about 'Opinion in France'. One such report, three months after Mers-el-Kebir, 
asserted that, 'Even Mers-el-Kebir is being brought back into the public eye, with the publication of a 
special brochure by 'L 'Illustration'. Yet the state of public opinion on these incidents may be guessed from 
a French sailor's talk on Radio Paris; he complained that "people still believe that Mers-el-Kebir is an 
invention of German propaganda". The campaign against the 'anglophiles' and de Gaullists has not 
abated' 27 . Although the sailor's view paints a negative view of Vichy and German policy, it also illustrates 
the lengths that they went to to exploit this incident. Many other listeners and readers did interpret this anti-
British and anti-de Gaulle propaganda as fact. 
The people of southern France were constantly under fire from Vichy propaganda but they also 
supported the Vichy Government more vehemently than the occupied French. It enabled the Vichy 
Government to exploit all the latent jealousy of the British Navy among French sailors and to present de 
Gaulle nakedly as a British tooe8 without being detected by their southern flock. Petain spoke out against 
the Free French saying that they were more against Vichy France than against the Nazis. Petain queried 
why, on the day before Mers-el-Kebir, de Gaulle had talked so much about the "glorious dead of the French 
Navy" in his radio broadcast. Petain was suspicious of de Gaulle for de Gaulle had said that in former times 
the old heroes of the Navy had never delivered their fleet intact to the eneml9. 'If the Marshal could not 
stomach Gaullism, it was because, like many at Uriage, he could not forgive Mers-el-Kebir, Dakar and 
Syria' 30 . Furthermore, at Vichy, 'il ne manquait pas d'hommes politiques et surtout de militaires pour 
susurrer aux oreilles de Petain, volontiers attentif, que !'operation de Mers-ei-Kebir avait ete soufflee aux 
Anglais par "le general felon". Churchill n'en avait pas moins une dette d'honneur envers le general de 
27 FO 371 24314 1940 France File No.65 Cll253, French Intelligence Section 'Opinion in France 29 September- 13 October 1940'. 
28 Le Temps (Edition de Clermont-Ferrand, 26 September 1940), p.l. 
29 White, Seeds of Discord, p.87. 
3° Captain Pierre Dunoyer de Segonzac quoted in W.D. Halls, The Youth of France (Oxford, 1981), p.395. 
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Gaulle' 31 . Even staunch anglophiles such as Puaux, the High Commissioner of Syria, and others in the 
service of Vichy, were dismayed and badly shaken. The majority of people in unoccupied France supported 
Petain and his government in 1940 and would not believe in anything contrary to the Marshal's opinions. 
The effect of this was still partly felt in 1942, when POW's in Madagascar were asked for their views on 
the Free French and the British. 'Many didn't want to join the Free French as they preferred captivity to 
committing what they regard as an act of betrayal of their military superiors and government. ... Mers-el-
Kebir and the seizure ofthe French ships in British ports were grave errors of judgment in his view, and the 
only thing the British could do was to say nothing and hope that the pressure of current events would cause 
the French gradually to forget' 32• 
The basic facts of the Mers-el-Kebir incident and the Vichy propaganda led to many southern French 
blaming de Gaulle for advising the British to undertake the 'tragedie'. In the Clermont-Ferrand edition of 
'Le Figaro' on 5 July 1940, a French columnist wrote that England 'a ete mal inspiree ou peut-etre mal 
conseillee par les Franc;ais de Londres' 33 • De Gaulle and the Free French movement were portrayed and 
viewed as traitors. H.R. Kedward illustrates this quite clearly about the southern French people. He 
explains that, 'Partly because ofMers-el-Kebir, and the resulting Anglophobia, partly because the 
broadcasts became the object of official Vichy antagonism and technological interference from the 
Germans, and partly because the general philosophy of a confused and demoralised public was not to upset 
what little equilibrium remained, it quickly became a sign of opposition to call oneself a Gaullist, whether 
one knew anything about de Gaulle or not' 34• In his speech of 8 July, de Gaulle grieved for the loved ones 
of the dead at Mers-el-Kebir but accepted that the action taken was necessary to the British. He expressed 
the opinion that, '11 n'y a pas le moindre doute que, par principe et par necessite, l'ennemi les aurait unjour 
employes, soit contre I' Angleterre, soit contre notre propre Empire. Eh bien! Je dis sans ambages qu'il vaut 
mieux qu'ils aient ete detruits! J'aime mieux savoir, meme le 'Dunkerque', notre beau, notre cher, notre 
puissant 'Dunkerque', echoue devant Mers-el-Kebir que de le voir unjour, monte par les Allemands, 
bombarder les ports anglais ou bien Alger, Casablanca, Dakar' 35 . This lead to a major difference of opinion 
31 Marc Ferro, Petain (Paris, 1987), pp.l60-l. 
32 FO 898/210, Lieutenant C.A. Whitney-Smith's visit to the crew of the submarine Ajax (in POW Camp 24, 11-12 June 1942, 
Madagascar). 
33 Le Figaro, "Les Consequences d'un geste" (Edition de Clermont-Ferrand, 5 July 1940), p.l. 
34 Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p.210. 
35 De Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre I, p.276. 
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with the unoccupied zone. Only a few of his compatriots sympathised with him. This speech of 8 July also 
confirmed many French opinions that de Gaulle had had a hand in Operation 'Catapult' and this alienated 
them from the Free French as well as from the British36. 
Other Frenchmen believed that de Gaulle had not worked with the British but had incited them to attack 
the French port. The basic premise for this accusation originates from the opinion of the Gaullists in late 
June regarding the French Fleet. The Free French thought that Article Eight envisaged surrendering the 
French Fleet to the Germans. As Muselier put it, 'Naval units were to be disarmed in their port of 
commissioning and almost all had been commissioned in the northern ports, occupied by the Germans' 37. 
However, General Huntziger received an oral amendment allowing the disarming of the fleet to take place 
in southern ports. When dining with Churchill on 16 June, de Gaulle said, 'Quoi qu'il arrive, lui dis-je, la 
flotte franc;aise ne sera pas volontairement livn\e. Petain lui-meme n'y consentirait pas. D'ailleurs, la flotte, 
c'est la fief de Darlan. Un feodal ne livre pas son fief' 38• This belief by the Free French may have been one 
of the causes of the incident at Oran in Algeria. This is backed up by Admiral Menzies, Chief of the British 
Intelligence Service, who, after the war asserted that, 'We had false information which said the French 
Fleet was to be ceded to the Germans. Don't forget, also, that the French in London had helped to create a 
particular state of mind, by declaring that the fleet was going to fall into German hands' 39 . 'P.L. Bret 
inquired whether, in saying over the radio that the French government would surrender its fleet, de Gaulle 
had not involuntarily influenced the decision of the P.M.'40• On the other hand, many have stated, including 
Aidan Crawley, Herve Coutau-Begarie and Claude Huan, that the Free French view would not have made 
the slightest difference to Churchill. For him, it was simply a question of British security. 
The phrase 'Anglo-Gaullism' 41 sums up what some French people thought of de Gaulle and his 
movement. They believed that de Gaulle was working for and with the British, assisting British imperialism 
and being to some extent controlled by Churchill and his Government. To back their points up, de Gaulle 
had throughout this traumatic period emphasised the need for a Franco-British Alliance. His speeches on 
36 FO 371 24314 Cll691, Postal Censorship Reports 'Unoccupied France' No.86 (15 November, 1940): 'La Chapelle-Pontenevaux'. 
37 Vice Admiral Muselier quoted in J-R. Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle (London, 1964), p.l24. 
38 De Gaulle Memoires de Guerre I, p.61 
39 Admiral Stewart Menzies quoted in Tournoux, Petain and de Gaulle, p.l24. 
40 Paul-Louis Bret, 'Au Feu des Evenements' (Paris, 1959) p.l83 quoted in White, Seeds of Discord, p.87. 
41 Azema, From Munich to the Liberation, p.211. 
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the radio and at Oxford University emphasise this. 'If de Gaulle could criticize Vichy as being a puppet 
government for Berlin, it was obvious that Vichy would answer that Free France was controlled by the 
British- by the hated British that had attacked their fleet at Oran' 42 . It was not just the Communists who 
viewed de Gaulle as a mercenary in the pay of British imperialists43 
For the most part, from 1940-1942, the Mers-el-Kebir incident provoked negative reactions to de 
Gaulle's movement. However there were some southern French people who approved of the British action 
at Oran and some positive aspects for de Gaulle that can be extracted from the incident. Interviewed in 
1971, a 'Marseillaise' stated that she had 'approved ofthe English attack on the French Fleet at Mers-el-
Kebir. I understood why the English had done it. The French Fleet ought to have gone over to the English 
side in defiance of the Armistice' 44 . In his memoirs, Churchill later wrote, 'In a village near Toulon dwelt 
two peasant families, each of whom had lost their sailor son by British fire at Oran. A funeral service was 
arranged to which all their neighbours sought to go. Both families requested that the Union Jack should lie 
upon the coffins side by side with the Tricolour, and their wishes were respectfully observed. In this we 
may see how the comprehending spirit of simple folk touches the sublime'45 • Furthermore, Pierre Laborie, a 
specialist in French public opinion, has written that by the end of 1940, 'Malgre le drame de Mers-el-Kebir, 
l'affaire de Dakar et le poids d'un discours anglophobe, la majorite de !'opinion reste favorable a la cause 
britannique et souhaite ouvertement sa victoire face a 1'Allemagne'46• 
There were some positive aspects for de Gaulle that resulted from the Mers-el-Kebir incident. De Gaulle 
profited from the breaking off of communication between Petain's government and Great Britain on 5 July 
1940. Their relations would never be the same again and it also meant that the southern French understood 
the situation much more clearly. It was now slightly more apparent to them that de Gaulle and the British 
were co-operating with each other, that it seemed unlikely that the Marshal and the General were working 
together against Germany, and that divisions were beginning to emerge between the Marshal and the 
Gaullists. Speaking of de Gaulle's speech of 8 July, Aiden Hatch noted that, 'By his extremely intelligent 
42 G.E. Maguire, Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French (Hampshire and London, 1995), p.5. 
43 L 'Humanite No. 107 (Edition de zone sud) 'A bas la guerre imperialiste' (Limoges, 29 May 1941 ), p.l. 
44 Interview of Mile. Madeleine Baudouin, 6 September 1971, Marseille, quoted in Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p.276. 
45 A story told by M. Teitgen, member of the Resistance Movement, quoted in Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War: Vol. 11-
Their Finest Hour (London, 1949), p.212. 
46 Pierre Laborie, L'opinion francaise sous Vichy (Paris, 1990), p.239. 
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handling of the tragic and delicate situation which might well have ruptured the fragile entente between 
Free France and her only ally, de Gaulle for the first time proved that as a statesman he might be arrogant 
and unbending, but he would never go beyond what was possible' 47 . However, it took a long time for the 
southern French to get over what they termed a 'tragedie'. 'Rare were the Frenchmen after Mers-ei-Kebir 
who, like General Laure, in his prison camp, clung to the hope that "Bordeaux and London will find a way 
to get together even after Mers-ei-Kebir which must have been the momentary result of a reciprocal lack of 
understanding'" 48 • Even so, they grew in numbers as time and events went by. 
Though de Gaulle and the Free French were greatly affected by the incident, it must not be forgotten that 
the main responsibility for Mers-ei-Kebir lay on the shoulders of the British. They bore the brunt of the 
criticism and Anglophobia swept through unoccupied France in July 1940. Press reports in the 'free' zone 
were very unfavourable to the British. Though far from favourable to the Germans, they could not conceal 
their anger and scorn. Some newspapers even wrote that 'Mers-ei-Kebir has restored to France her liberty 
ofaction' 49. Misleading and even false information was utilised by the soon-to-be-called 'Vichy 
Government' against the British. 'Le Figaro', under the 'Recit Offlciel du Combat' written by Admiral 
Fran.yois Darlan, stated that Vice-Admiral Gensoul received the following incorrect ultimatum:- 'ou bien 
rallier la flotte anglaise ou bien detruire les batiments dans Ies six heures pour qu'ils ne tombent pas entre 
Ies mains de]' Allemagne ou d'ltalie. En cas de refus les Anglais nous contraindraient par la force a cette 
destruction' 50• The speech by Vice-Admiral Gensoul at the Mers-el-Kebir cemetery was used to full effect 
by the propagandists: 'Vous avez promis d'obeir a vos chefs pour tout ce qu'ils vous commanderaient pour 
l'honneur du pavilion et la grandeur des armes de la France. Si, aujourd'hui, il y a une tache sur un 
pavilion, ce n'est certainement pas sur le notre' 51 • 'La Perflde Albion' was personified by Winston 
Churchill who bore the brunt of the blame, not only from the French but from the British Navy. Churchill 
later wrote, 'This was a hateful decision, the most unnatural and painful in which I have ever been 
concerned' 52 . Finally, not all French people coupled de Gaulle with the British. Many Frenchmen thought 
47 Aiden Hatch, The De Gaulle nobody knows: An intimate biography of Charles de Gaulle (New York, 1960), p.lll. 
48 Unpublished manuscript of General Laure 'Des Fronts de 1939-1940 a la Haute Cour de 1948' (diary), p.6, quoted in Adrienne 
Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy, Vichy 1940-1942 (Geneva and Paris, 1958), p.67. 
49 Le Figaro, 'Les Consequences d'un Geste' (5 July 1940), p.l. 
50 Admiral Darlan's communique quoted in Le Figaro (5 July 1940), p.l. 
51 Vice-Admiral Gensoul's speech (5 July 1940) quoted in Le Figaro (4 August 1940), p.2. 
52 Churchill, Second World War Vol. 11, p.206. 
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that the British were solely responsible for the 'tragedie' and that de Gaulle's speech on 8 July was anti-
British 53 • They viewed the Free French and the British as totally separate entities. 
To conclude, we must evaluate two historians' opinions on the subject of how important Mers-el-Kebir 
was in the months and years that lay ahead. Warren Tute explains that, 'In France herself, still numbed by 
the shock of defeat; with the country slashed into two zones; with a million and a half of her men P.O.W's; 
with communications disrupted and a population dazed beyond measure by what had happened to them in 
the last two months: the outrage ofMers-el-Kebir passed as just one further calamity to which the only 
reaction was that it was incomprehensible. They had all been through too much .... The memory of Mers-el-
Kebir became submerged in the torrent of daily events. What had been done was not forgotten; it was 
simply and for a time overlaid54• In the context of what people thought in the free zone, this is untrue. The 
politicians appear to have been deeply affected by Mers-el-Kebir,and this reaction made them less disposed 
to resist the granting of full powers to Petain a week later. The French people followed the politicians' lead. 
They lapped up the anti-British and anti-de Gaulle propaganda and memories of the incident lingered on in 
their consciousness, assisted by Vichy's constant reminders55 and the further blunders of Great Britain and 
the Free French forces. Inadeq~:mte communication was quite a serious crime attributed to Vice-Admiral 
Gensoul in the Mers-el-Kebir incident, but the last person that Petain and the French people would blame 
would be one of their own Admirals. De Gaulle may well have been the perfect French scapegoat for 
Petain's government, taking the place ofGensoul who was never held accountable for his mistake. 
In 1958, Adrienne Hytier wrote the following:- 'French public opinion was sadly troubled by Mers-el-
Kebir; only the staunch resisted the event and the clever made use of it. But this was, after all, only moral 
damage and any evaluation of it in material results is impossible' 56 . This was not, after all, 'only' moral 
damage. It was a disaster for Britain and de Gaulle. In general, the French people take morality very 
seriously. The moral damage which was inflicted upon them would have been tremendous. If at first their 
consciences had told them to s1:1pport de Gaulle and the Allied cause, they would have suffered from a 
53 Jean Boutron, De Mers-el-Kebir a Londres: 1940-1944 (Paris, 1980), pp.127-128 and Albert Vulliez, Mers-el-Kebir (Paris, 1975), 
p.272. 
54 Warren Tute, The Deadly Stroke (London, 1973), pp.205-210. 
55 op-cit, pp.ll-13. 
56 Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy. p.68 
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moral crisis:- whether to carry on supporting what many people now branded the 'traitors', or to follow 
paternalistic Petain and his "all-French" govemment57• 
Apart from a few positive aspects, Mers-el-Kebir gravely affected the popularity of the Gaullists in 
unoccupied France. Although the French population had fewer misgivings about whose side Petain and de 
Gaulle were on, they were still shocked by the 'massacre'. In 1940, de Gaulle was seen by many as a 
British lackey who served British imperial interests. Many thought that he had had a hand in the Mers-ei-
Kebir incident or had incited it to take place. People were even less inclined to rally to the Free French than 
before and had it not been for de Gaulle's tenacity and courage, his movement would have been strangled 
at birth. The German and Vichy propaganda used against de Gaulle further hindered his popularity stakes, 
and after Dakar and before Montoire in late September to October 1940, de Gaulle's popularity in southern 
France stood at an all-time low while Petain was revered everywhere he went. It was only as time went by, 
especially in 1942, that the people in the unoccupied zone started to forgive and forget whatever they 
blamed de Gaulle for in the 'massacre'. 
Mers-el-Kebir made de Gaul'le very unpopular in the 'free' zone. It was a serious threat to his 
movement's survival. A hole had been dug for his political grave. De Gaulle would have to make sure that, 
ultimately, the Vichy Government fell into it; but not without some help from external sources. 
57 op cit, pp.I4-16. 
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The Progress of the Free French Movement. 
Mers-el-Kebir was an external event which greatly affected de Gaulle and the Free French Movement. 
External events were influential, as were the internal actions and policies of the Free French themselves. 
This chapter will study the ways in which internal events within the Free French Movement affected 
support for Gaullism in unoccupied France. 
There is a classic scenario that has been passed down from the generations of Gaullists to an at first 
willing French public58 . Charles de Gaulle was the first resister: he bravely left France on 16 June 1940, 
commandeering an aeroplane to take him to London. On 18 June 1940, he broadcast his 'appel' on BBC 
Radio to the French nation and this provoked a tremendous reaction in the provinces, not least increasing 
resistance numbers. As the weeks passed by, more and more people answered de Gaulle's call to arms and 
he was able to gain many French colonial possessions. The French nation were a nation of resisters who 
looked to de Gaulle for leadership and support. 
Unfortunately, the truth was very different. In a hastily put together last minute escape plan, de Gaulle 
asked permission and was allowed to fly on General Spears' aeroplane back to London from Bordeaux but 
to be sure that he was not captured, he lay low until just before the plane took off and jumped onto the 
plane as it careered down the runway. After a few major disagreements about allowing de Gaulle to 
broadcast his speech on the radio, the British decided to grant him one speech on 18 June. However, the 
initial reaction to his 'appel' was very poor and his gains from the French Empire were more out of 
desperation for increasing the numbers of Free French recruits and inheriting some French soil to use as a 
base than for any reasons of prestige or greatness. The whole Free French operation was, in the very 
beginning, not much short of a fiasco 59. 
Many French people feared that they themselves would become traitors if they joined de Gaulle's Free 
French Movement. People in France considered two conceptions. The first one was that the people who had 
joined de Gaulle had 'taken refuge in flight' 60, not really knowing what they were letting themselves in for. 
They only knew that de Gaulle was actively seeking to resist the Nazis. The second conception was that 
58 De Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre I (1954) is an example of the glorification ofGaullism. 
59 Major-General Sir Edward Spears, Two men who saved France: Petain and de Gaulle (London, I 966) is more realistic about de 
Gaulle's initial 'appel'. 
60 Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p.396. 
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these people had not considered that de Gaulle had allied himself with a nation stigmatised by capitalist 
propaganda. They wondered whether they could resist Vichy from within France, in a more secretive way, 
than by remaining in London. They did not find de Gaulle's proposals particularly appealing. They found it 
extremely difficult to accept that there existed a national government outside of France and they were also 
apprehensive about establishing a resistance centre in England as it might jeopardise future endeavours 
within the French Empire. Some people even thought that staying in England was treason and that if 
England was defeated or if Vichy rule remained in post-war France, they would be punished or denied 
French citizenship. 
From a survey of letters to the United States, the Foreign Office found that de Gaulle was not often 
mentioned in letters from France. Of the letters which did refer to him, comments were 'enthusiastic, 
faintly contemptuous and actively hostile in equal proportions' 61 • 
Even though de Gaulle was hoping to woo Petain's followers by moderating his attitude to Vichy, he 
was still perceived as a traitor by many who viewed his distaste for Petain and his regime as scandalous. 
However, the Free French Movement fought not just against the armistice and the Vichy regime but also 
against the Nazi enemy and he struggled for recognition from the Allies as the legitimate representative of 
the French State as well as protecting French interests from any of his own Allies' imperial intentions. It 
could be said that de Gaulle was fighting too many people at once and suffered because of it. With such 
opposition, it is not surprising that de Gaulle was branded a traitor. 
General Spears noticed that de Gaulle was not popular in France because 'the more individuals felt the 
lash his courage inflicted on their cowardice, the more bitter they were' 62 . They would insult him, referring 
to him as a charlatan and attributing his treasonable acts to the days when he was an unpopular army officer 
and to his resentment at being put in his place by the Marshal. The General was also misunderstood on 
occasion; he was thought of as dictatorial63 . The population of France only knew him as a voice on the 
radio and most could not believe how much he assumed. There was, naturally, little liking for rebels in the 
French Army and de Gaulle was held in low esteem by most ofthem and a few of them were very hostile 
61 FO 371 24314 Cll691 Postal Censorship Reports 'Unoccupied France' No.86 (15 November, 1940). Also refer to Postal 
Censorship Reports 'Letters to USA' No.82 (25 October, 1940), Cl2516 Captain Colbert quoted from His Majesty's Ambassador at 
Lisbon in Minute by Naval Attache H. D. Owen 'Public Opinion in France' (25 November, 1940), and FO 371 28268 French File 
No.45 Z 117 Despatch to Anthony Eden from Consul General Francis Patron (30 December 1940, Barcelona). 
62 Spears, Two men who saved France, p.l41. 
63 Bidault, Resistance, p.80. 
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towards him. A major question which must be debated is whether de Gaulle was aware of the importance of 
public opinion in unoccupied France in 1940. Professor Nicholas Wahl, a political expert from America, 
believed that Free France's higher standing and importance was due to de Gaulle's instant understanding of 
the spirit of resistance in France in 1940. Others, including Henri Frenay, were confident that de Gaulle 
only became aware of the importance of French public opinion after Jean Moulin's first visit to France in 
the autumn of 1941. Jean Lacouture considered that even though de Gaulle tried to persuade the French 
people that without him there would be no resistance, he still quickly formed links between himself and the 
Resistance so that by the end of 1940, Captain Passy and his agents were able to relay back to him that the 
frrst signs of resistance and hopes for self-liberation had stirred in France64 . 
Perhaps de Gaulle was named a traitor because he was not well-known or was feared by many in France. 
They did not understand the man behind the BBC microphone. He was an 'inconnu' and so were many of 
those who joined the Free French Movement. Hardly anyone in France listened to de Gaulle's 'call to 
resistance' on 18 June 1940. France was in chaos at that time with millions of refugees fleeing southwards 
and westwards and continued fighting leading to utter confusion. There were not many people listening to 
the BBC radio broadcasts at that time. However, we must not forget that the appeal was chiefly addressed 
to French soldiers stranded in England. A great proportion of Frenchmen who travelled to England to fight 
on had not come across de Gaulle's name before, including the unknown Captain Dewavrin ('Passy') who 
refused the English pressure put upon him to enter their Intelligence Service. They laid insults against de 
Gaulle's movement but Passy decided to join de Gaulle instead. 
Charles de Gaulle suffered from his rather insignificant past. He had not attained the rank, reputation, 
power, authority or legality to introduce his policies which stemmed mostly from the Right. He knew this 
himself and at frrst he tried to find a leader who was superior to him and could attract more support to the 
cause. The announcement of28 June 1940 which recognised de Gaulle as the leader of the Free French 
organisation did in fact expose to the world the failure of any senior personality to undertake further 
resistance in the name of France with promised British assistance. The French people were supposedly 
unaffected by him according to a Postal Censorship Report which stated that 'from the general lack of 
64 Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, pp.255-6. 
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reference to the movement of Free Frenchmen, it seems probable that to a great many Frenchmen living in 
France- immersed in their present troubles- Charles de Gaulle is little more than a name' 65 . 
Those who did actively join de Gaulle's new movement had to believe and adhere to certain ideas. They 
had to fmd the recent French compromises alarming and be willing to fight against these decisions. They 
needed to be willing to fight against the existing French state. Another prerequisite of this 'esprit frant;ais 
lib re '66 was to agree to an affiliation with de Gaulle but also to put up with his fits of rage, his coldness and 
his rudeness. Even de Gaulle recognised that his movement was really a 'one-man show' due to the fact 
that not many people matched the selection criteria of the Free French organisation. This 'one-man show' 
certainly attracted a mixed crowd; some were not at all sympathetic to democracy and republicanism while 
others seemed to be playing a double and pro-Vichy game. Most ofthem were anonymous patriots who had 
no pre-war standing and were members of the working classes. Principally, they came from Paris, Alsace 
and Lorraine, but most of all from Brittany. The m£tiority of men from Brittany were merchant seamen and 
fishermen and by September, they constituted two thirds of the number of men who joined the Free French 
forces. These new recruits also found de Gaulle's attitude very icy and whatever the reasons behind it, a 
gulf now opened between de Gaulle and the rest of his movement. By the end of 1940, the Gaullist 
movement amounted to thirty-five thousand but most of these were from Equatorial Africa and not from 
France. Most of these men were new men who were suddenly thrust into positions of authority. There were 
very few genuine resisters of the first hour and even fewer who were from France. 
De Gaulle came up against a lot of resentment amongst Frenchmen in England. Vice-Admiral Muselier 
always heard the same comments from them: 'Pourquoi restons-nous ici a ne rien faire? Puisque la guerre 
est finie, pourquoi ne rentrons-nous pas en France?' 67 . The sailors were disinterested in what de Gaulle had 
to say and during the vast amount of spare time that they had, they listened to and concurred with the Vichy 
government broadcasts on the radio and were angered by the forced eviction from their ships. 
One of the reasons for the lack of Free French numbers partly concerned the Gaullist leaders themselves. 
Many former Navy men would not join the Free French navy because they did not like Muselier68 and 
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others were driven away because they disliked de Gaulle, an opinion shared by Muselier69• There were also 
pitfalls in joining the Free French. The men thought that revenge might be taken against their families and 
therefore felt that they were needed at home; Vichy officials contacted Gaullist recruits in London to 
confirm their worst fears. For the individual volunteers, it was no small matter that as soldiers of a Free 
French army, they had no claim to be treated as Prisoners of War if captured. They did not want to get 
mixed up with politics by enlisting with de Gaulle and many chose to enlist in the British forces instead. 
The Free French recruits were a small minority of the exiled Frenchmen in England who disapproved of the 
armistice. This was due to the stigma of supporting a dissident and dishonoured ex-general. 
Of the men who joined the higher ranks of the Free French Movement, many were power-hungry 
adventurers and intriguers. This led to petty arguments, false accusations and disunity among the higher 
and lower ranks. Vice-Admiral Muselier, one of the principal leaders of the Free French Movement, has 
laid all the blame for the disorganisation of the movement on the intentional deviousness of the general. 
While de Gaulle was away in Africa in the autumn of 1940, Muselier believes he deliberately tried to make 
himself indispensable but only made his movement more unpopular because of its ineffectiveness without 
him. With three men sharing the power of 'La France Libre' in London and Muselier being the superior of 
the three, there was a lot of conflict. Muselier later wrote, 'Il [de Gaulle] divisait ses principaux 
collaborateurs, les dressait contre les autres et cn~ait un etat de fait qui ... ne pouvait que diminuer l'autorite 
que j 'aurais du a voir, comme le plus anciens de ses officiers generaux, dans un mouvement qui, aux termes 
memes de !'accord du 7 aout, etait un mouvement purement militaire' 70 . This situation was exacerbated by 
the initial problems of de Gaulle's embryonic military intelligence office headed by Passy whose first 
mission was to report on German preparations for the invasion of Britain. These undercover men had four 
tries and four failures, a result which disheartened the Free French recruits and annoyed the British. 
The Gaullist movement was badly organised. An ideology did exist and its basic message was a powerful 
and uncomplicated one: the primacy of the national interest, the importance of collaboration between social 
classes, and the necessity of a post-war renewal of parliamentary institutions and political elites 71 . 
However, in 1940, de Gaulle had no interest in developing a political agenda. He wanted to fight for victory 
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first and then worry later about the politics of the matter. He also wanted to attract as many people as 
possible to his movement. He did not discuss democracy because he knew how unpopular the Third 
Republic stiii was. Without a political manifesto to speak of, people in France mistrusted de Gaulle and his 
followers72 . They did not know what he would do if he became leader after the war had ended. They could 
only go off facts and they were not particularly appealing, especially the fact that the British Government 
was his sole financial and material benefactor and that if it was not for Churchill's support, de Gaulle 
would probably become a 'nobody' again. De Gaulle's policy led to people in unoccupied France believing 
that he was not effective as a leader. 
In the autumn of 1940, when de Gaulle gained a stronghold in the French Empire, it was viewed by most 
people in unoccupied France as an attempt to steal the French Empire. De Gaulle also seemed disinterested 
in gaining a foothold in unoccupied France. In 1940, Free France gained a number of new territories from 
the French Empire. By the end of the year, they had taken possession of the New Hebrides, the 'Comptoirs 
Fran~ais' in India, Tahiti, the French territories ofOceanie, New Caledonia and French Equatorial Africa, 
the Chad, the Cameroons and Congo-Brazzaville. De Gaulle assumed sole authority over all these 
territories but did not find it easy to persuade the colonies to submit to him. Dissidence was not respected in 
the colonies as much as in metropolitan France. When the Free French finally gained a foothold in 
Equatorial Africa in the name of'La France Libre', this opinion in France and the French Empire changed 
to one of lack of enthusiasm for de Gaulle's new venture. Weygand later wrote that de Gaulle liked to stir 
things up in France with his inaccurate portrayals ofNazi pressure on Vichy colonial possessions73 . This 
made de Gaulle very unpopular in Vichy circles and the French government tried to scupper the Gaullists' 
chances of success in the empire. 
The French Empire ensured the survival of Gaullism according to one of de Gaulle's most loyal 
followers, Gaston Palewski. He thought that de Gaulle would have become a stateless exile and tool of the 
British had he not been acknowledged in the French Empire. Palewski remarked that 'it all really began in 
Africa' 74 • De Gaulle could now more truly state that he was speaking 'in the name of France' even though 
most Frenchmen still believed this to be preposterous. 
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De Gaulle's conquest of the French Empire also brought about his most humiliating military failure of 
the Second World War. Free France's joint expedition with British forces to Dakar in September 1940 met 
with a resounding defeat at the hands of Vichy forces determined to sustain Vichy rule in Dakar. De 
Gaulle's agents had sent back reports that the population at Dakar were mostly in favour of the general. 
These reports were very inaccurate. The appearance of three modem French cruisers at Dakar was blamed 
on a leak by the Free French in London. The British felt that they could not be trusted anymore and this 
reputation for security leaks became common knowledge in France. It is very difficult to conclude whether 
French people blamed de Gaulle or the British more for the Dakar failure. In Britain, newspapers laid the 
blame at Churchill's feet. One view is that the French Navy were out for revenge on the Royal Navy and 
they could not have cared less if de Gaulle got caught in the crossfire. A Postal Censorship Report from 
November 1940 confirms this opinion. From Tangier, a letter read: '[Dakar] has damaged de Gaulle's 
prestige somewhat. All the French papers try to make out that the whole thing was an English attack, and 
tend to put de Gaulle on one side as a tool of the English' 75 • 
Other newspapers laid the blame directly against the Free French leader: 'On pouvait penser que !'ex-
general conduit les forces etrangeres a l'attaque contre ses compatriotes. Ceux des fran-;ais qui hesitaient 
encore a le considerer comme un traitre ont desormais les yeux ouverts' 76 The world watched as Dakar 
defended itself in the name of the Marshal and repulsed de Gaulle who looked all alone at that point in 
time. Many French people believed that de Gaulle was the instigator of the attack and also the cause of its 
failure and therefore they never thought seriously about collaborating with him. 
The Free French leader had played right into the hands of the Vichy authorities. They gloated over his 
failure and sent planes from Morocco to bomb Gibraltar as an act of defiance. Paul Baudouin feared, as no 
doubt many others did, that 'ifDakar falls, North Africa will soon be invaded by the Germans. This means 
a campaign in Africa and certainly the occupation of Marseilles and Toulon' 77• Referring to the promise by 
de Gaulle and his movement never to fight other Frenchmen, General Weygand later wrote, 'Comment le 
general de Gaulle a-t-il pu se decider a lancer contre des troupes fran-;aises des soldats fran-;aises entretenus 
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par l'Angleterre en vertu d'un accord specifiant qu'ils ne devraientjamais etre engages contre leur 
compatriotes?' 78 • De Gaulle had mentioned at the same time that as a last resort, Frenchmen would fight 
Frenchmen but he also used the argument that Vichy troops did not represent France and therefore were not 
French troops. This did not go down well in unoccupied France. The failure at Dakar was like taking two 
steps back for de Gaulle after he had taken his first step forward since Mers-ei-Kebir. He had provoked a 
civil war. He was branded an assassin79 
However, it was not all doom and gloom for de Gaulle as he set up his Free French Movement. There 
were some positive aspects which arose from events in 1940. There were some demonstrations in France 
that supported de Gaulle's cause such as some student processions for de Gaulle in August and the 
procession of students who tried to lay a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier on 11 November 
1940 in the name of de Gaulle but were stopped by French and German police; the Germans opened fire on 
the crowd killing several of them. This act of defiance became a spur to the Gaullist cause. De Gaulle's 
'call' of June and July 1940 gave hope to Frenchmen who felt aggrieved by the armistice declaration. It 
was also published widely in unoccupied France. For instance, extracts were published by 'Le Progres de 
Lyon' on 19 June and by 'Le Petit Proven~al' in Marseilles. M.Louis de la Bardonnie said, 'I entered the 
Resistance from the moment I heard de Gaulle's first broadcast.. .. when I realised what de Gaulle was 
saying I called out "We've won the war!" I had never heard of de Gaulle until that moment ... ' 80. A P.R. 
agent, Richmond Temple, was also brought in by the British to improve de Gaulle's reputation. 
De Gaulle could be proud of his movement and so could his supporters. La France Libre entered the war 
in a small way with the Free French Air Force bombing the Ruhr, which was a notable achievement in such 
a short space of time. De Gaulle's use of the BBC radio facilities more than anything else helped to 
establish his name and reputation. In the southern zone, listening to de Gaulle was not a crime until 
November 1940. This imposed ban made others more inquisitive to listen in to the BBC. Without the BBC, 
de Gaulle would probably have been a nobody according to Georges Bidault81 . This exposure from the 
radio helped to instil some respect and sympathy from native French people when de Gaulle was 
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condemned to death by the Vichy authorities. Worn wedding rings were sent over so that de Gaulle could 
sell them to help France liberate herself. Someone sent a picture of de Gaulle's mother's grave; she died in 
July 1940. The grave was heaped high with flowers and dedications to her and her son. Publications around 
the world reported that de Gaulle's popularity in France was growing. In December 1940, 'Time' remarked 
that de Gaulle's stature was growing in France and the 'New York Times' believed the number ofGaullist 
sympathisers in unoccupied France to be increasing82• At first, the Free French had to rely on such 
publications and censorship reports for news of Gaullist activity in unoccupied France83 • 
There are other positive aspects of the first few months of the Free French Movement. The adoption of 
the Cross of Lorraine as an emblem for the movement in late July 1940 assisted de Gaulle in his attempt to 
create the embryo of a new French state. To give his organisation a semblance of legality, on 27 October 
1940, de Gaulle issued a manifesto, two ordinances and a declaration which constituted the "Charter" of the 
Free French Movement. After returning from Africa, de Gaulle now believed in his own authority and was 
now convinced that he was the only man who could restore the prestige of France. The Empire also 
provided the Free French with a seat of government rather than them simply being a government in exile. 
Despite all these positive aspects, de Gaulle's movement was probably at its most unpopular in 1940. Its 
origins were very unspectacular and Vichy's reputation was still very positive. At this point in time, the 
only way that Free France could show themselves to be legitimate was by illustrating the immorality of the 
Vichy government. They had no well-known personality from a previous regime to add credence to their 
claims. Vichy was seen as the legitimate government. Furthermore, de Gaulle's harsh and aloof style made 
him very unpopular in France as well as in London. It is untrue that the 'response to Gaullism was even less 
enthusiastic in 1941 and 1942 than it had been in 1940'84 . 
Vice-Admiral Muselier has blamed all the misfortunes of 1940 on de Gaulle himself. He wrote, that 
when de Gaulle sent his bright young soldiers into battle, he dishonoured them by engaging them in a 
fratricidal battle against Vichy forces. He wished to suppress these ambitious young men so only he could 
be recognised as the incarnation of France. His insults against Vichy and calls to rally to his movement 
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nearly drove Petain into the arms of the Germans and nearly led to a Franco-British war85 . Muselier 
believes that de Gaulle was a dictator who cared about nothing but his own prestige. This is a highly biased 
opinion but it is true that de Gaulle did not make many friends in the early days of the Free French 
Movement. Then again, in 1940 de Gaulle was thinking more about future support than about the present 
insubstantial support that he had amassed in July. The Gaullists' classic scenario about how de Gaulle had 
the support of a French nation of resisters was utterly false. He was still all alone at the end of 1940 but by 
that time, he wanted to be alone so that he could become the embodiment of the French nation86. De Gaulle 
set up his organisation in the hope that in future years people would start to support him. The formation of 
the Gaullist movement in 1940 was not successful in gaining support in unoccupied France. As we shall see 
in a later chapter, Petain had gained the respect and loyalty of nearly all the southern French population. 
What the Free French did successfully was to chip away at the rock that Petain stood on top of. Their very 
existence did reassure quite a few Frenchmen in unoccupied France that there were alternatives to 
collaboration. 
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Petain's Counterweight: Vichy France. 
De Gaulle's attempt to create a resistance movement and power base was severely threatened by Petain's 
government at Vichy. His high profile meant that he became a perfect target for the Government's 
propaganda machine. The influence that the regime exerted weighed heavily on de Gaulle's shoulders, yet 
he decided from the outset that he would oppose it and try to turn the French people against it. This chapter 
will focus on how this groundbreaking decision and Vichy's response to it would greatly affect the extent 
of support for Gaullism in Unoccupied France. 
The Vichy Government stood for national unity and its three watchwords were 'Travail, Famille, Patrie'. 
They wanted to oversee the regeneration of French society and the purification of the French nation. 
However, De Gaulle viewed their whole existence as an anathema to what decent Frenchmen should stand 
for. De Gaulle believed that the Vichy Government was guilty of treason for selling their country to the 
Nazis, for the harsh authoritarian policies which they subjected to their own people, for the destruction of 
the Republican constitution, and for their constant policy of bending the truth to suit their own needs. There 
were many ways in which the Vichy regime consciously and unconsciously affected the support for de 
Gaulle in Vichy France and there were many ways in which Vichy used the consequences of de Gaulle 's 
actions to their advantage and disadvantage. 
One of the aforementioned factors was the policy of the Vichy Government. What the Vichy politicians 
found very hard to deal with in France during their administration was the shortages of food. They had two 
major issues of contention. The Royal Navy blockaded French ports preventing food and supplies from 
entering the country. The second major issue was that the Germans were taking a large proportion of the 
food meant for the French people. The Vichy Government was obviously siding against the British 
blockade and, in addition, the subsequent anti-British propaganda may have damaged de Gaulle's prestige. 
However, it would seem from some reports that the Vichy Government itself was held responsible by the 
metropolitan population for the ration shortage which only seemed to be an urban problem87• The Daily 
Mirror quoted information from a Swiss report: - 'There have been riots in unoccupied France and the 
collapse of rail and road transport, making food distribution impossible, is reducing the country to chaos. If 
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the Vichy Government does not succeed in obtaining concessions from the Germans before the autumn, 
says the Basle "National Zeitung", an internal crisis would appear inevitable' 88 . 
By the end of 1940, the regime's authority had slumped badly due to Vichy's misguided belief that 
Britain would surrender; this was the basic premise for the armistice. Throughout 1941 and 1942, their 
half-hearted collaboration provoked alarm in the French Empire and unsettled the French population. For 
instance, the sailors of the French Navy were tormented by the uncertain future of their fleet89 and the 
people of France were also shocked by some ofVichy's reasons for defending Syria, namely to assist in the 
German war effort90• Petain's stance on franc-ma<;ons led to an influential proportion of the population 
feeling isolated and unwelcome. The Revolution Nationale manifesto became a fiasco with hardly anyone 
believing in its proposals. The secretive and authoritarian measures that Vichy politicians employed caused 
constant antagonism between the people and themselves. The suddenness of these measures affected many; 
'purges' were regularly entertained in southern France from the outset of defeat91 • The clandestine 
newspaper 'Les Petites Ailes' stated that the Vichy Government had burnt their bridges in foreign affairs 
because they had agreed in principle to Hitler's war against Russia so, it said, to distract people from the 
armistice. However, it stated that the war against Russia was not aimed at defeating communism as much 
as it was to create 'lebensraum' for the Nazis92 • All of these issues added prestige to de Gaulle's war effort 
and denigrated Vichy. 
Vichy propaganda tried to make the compulsory labour service (STO) look materially advantageous but 
many Frenchmen were under no illusions as to what the STO would be like. There was divided opinion 
over this issue, just as there was over anti-Semitism. Only a minority lifted a fmger to help the Jews; most 
people in southern France remained indifferent, submissive and even hostile to the moral protest of the 
minoritl3. Vichy alienated much of their Catholic and Protestant support who were deeply affected by the 
mass deportations but many were glad that the Jews were being persecuted and not themselves. De Gaulle's 
speech of June 1942 called for liberation and hinted for a return to republican ideology. His speech was 
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considerably strengthened by the deportations of Jews in the same summer. This was bolstered by the Free 
French's message to decent Frenchmen in September which called for action and enlightened them on 
Vichy's anti-Semitic measures94 . 
The collaboration between Vichy and the Nazis became the Vichy government's biggest millstone around 
its neck. Its obligation to Germany was such that unpopular policies were created, unpopular ministers were 
installed and unpopular decisions were made. Overall, de Gaulle and his organisation were able to use 
Vichy policy to their great advantage. Collaboration was a great burden to carry and de Gaulle benefited 
greatly from a discredited regime. For instance, the meeting between Hitler and Petain at Montoire in 
October 1940 was a critical moment in the formation of public opinion which would later much advance 
the cause ofGaullism. De Gaulle and Laval's speeches of June 1942 contrasted sharply; one spoke of 
liberation and the other of German victory. This contrast was felt by a large number of Frenchmen. The 
policy most closely associated with the Vichy regime -that of Lava!- was unpopular among the 
government's supporters. His policy of out-and-out collaboration with the Germans was frowned upon by 
the mass of conservative Catholic Frenchmen who preferred Petain's vision of a regeneration of France, the 
technocrats' implementation of their own concepts and a return to the greatness of France. Vichy polarised 
France so that by late 1942, it had 'little more to parade in front of its audience than a blind confidence in 
Petain and a series oflegislative measures' which were bigoted and narrow95 . Vichy wasted their chance, 
did not make proper use of their opportunities, and lost what remained of their independence. They actively 
collaborated with the Germans, they censored the newspapers and they lost control of the French Empire. 
The cracks began to show in Petain's idealistic policies and the more cracks that appeared, the less likely 
it became that Vichy would resist and the less likely that the southern French would still support him. 
According to Rene Be1in, who was Secretaire du Travail then Ministre de la Production Industrielle et du 
Travail between 1940 and 1942, 'au fond, la critique essentielle contre Vichy se nourrit d'un refus de 
principe, d'un refus au nom de la morale, de ce qu'on nomme raison d'Etat' 96• This lack of focus and 
direction would benefit the Free French who seemed to many to have clear aims and objectives. 
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Furthermore, another paradox 'qui met en evidence l'une des contradictions du regime de Vichy ... est que 
son appel incantatoire a !'unite va s'accompagner de toute une serie de denonciations et inspirer une 
politique de proscription, comme si !'unite ne pouvait etre cimentee que par l'exclusion' 97• These 
contradictions would contribute to the slow disintegration of public support for Vichy. It would also bring 
others, including de Gaulle, into favour. The whole idea of Vichy would seem to be based on a farce. 
However, it was quite difficult for the people of unoccupied France to understand what was going on 
inside France and around the world. The population was oblivious to many of Vichy's misdeeds and was 
left in the dark when it came to explaining the benefits of new unfavourable legislative measures effected 
by the Government. Like any government, they kept sensitive information secret. However, they worked 
very hard to show themselves in the best possible light. They self-consciously lied many times to protect 
their regime from adverse public opinion and they lied about others such as de Gaulle and the British to 
show them in a bad light. Many took the propaganda at face value and believed that Vichy wanted to 
remain neutral at all costs. This was accompanied by the Government's need for an early peace and a final 
settlement on concessionary terms with Hitler. Most Frenchmen would accept anything that was deemed 
'to the benefit of France' at that time. The tactics that Vichy would favour were seen as underhand and 
indecent by some, but others would see the expected benefits from such measures98 . Up until the 
occupation of France, the vast majority of people may have grumbled about Vichy policy but still remained 
passive. 
A policy which Vichy adopted and fostered was the 'double game' theory. This concept was very popular 
among the French people in the southern zone during the war. It was disliked by the Free French who 
wanted to convince the southern French population that only de Gaulle could restore France's prestige and 
honour. There were many double game theories which need to be considered. 
Many people thought, rightly or wrongly, that Vichy was planning a double game by conceding to the 
Germans but also secretly planning to fight against them and help the Allied forces99• In his memoirs, 
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Weygand stated that Petain hoped in secret for the cessation of hostilities in North Africa in 1942 and was 
in agreement with Darlan's stance on the matter100. This concept of Allied and Vichy co-operation was 
reinforced by the consistent American support for the Vichy regime until late 1942. By fostering this 
support, Vichy was able to pacify many of their neighbours and dismiss de Gaulle as a traitor to France. De 
Gaulle was left out of the equation and this did great harm to his support base in the free zone; the French 
people took American opinion seriously. 
Others believed that Vichy were actively involved in defending France by capitulating to and 
collaborating with the Nazis. There was evidence that French officials at Vichy seized upon popular 
Anglophobic sentiment in 1940 and used it as more than just a propaganda tool. 'In a world in which 
Germany seemed to be rising and Britain declining, France might be compensated overseas for what she 
was losing on the continent' 101 . The fact that Vichy willingly supported the Nazis in their war against 
Russia was viewed by many in the Resistance as a firm step towards collaboration 102. Collaboration by 
Vichy can be viewed as having been undertaken to make the best of a bad situation with the good of France 
as their goal and to try and prevent greater German demands. In 1942, the Foreign Office received a report 
on Vichy officers' opinions 103 • It claimed that the officers thought that Laval's 'real object is to defend 
France from further German aggression as far as may be, and that the worst statements he makes such as 
that "he hopes that Germany will win" are only part of his subtlety'. Vichy consciously tried to promote 
this view and succeeded up to a point. This concept was partly responsible for stalling de Gaulle's quest for 
popular support up until about 1942. It certainly added to his difficulties. 
The factor that caused de Gaulle a great deal of harm but also may have benefited him was the idea that 
Petain and de Gaulle were in fact working together on the liberation and regeneration of France. It was a 
picture of two Frances: one represented the fighting spirit, the other represented the defence of the state. 
For the most part, Vichy dispelled any notion of involvement with de Gaulle for many reasons including 
their need to be the legitimate and supreme authority in France. According to Rene Remond, the 
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widespread view in France from 1940 to 1944 consisted ofthe sword and shield theory. French people 
wanted to believe that a secret agreement had been made between de Gaulle and Petain and their previous 
personal relationship lent credence to the idea. Colonel Remy, an ex-resister, and historian Franr;ois-
Georges Dreyfus are both advocates of this concept104. 
De Gaulle may have benefited from his name being linked with Petain's name and a section of the French 
population hitherto unattainable may have started to support him because of this, but the double game 
theory as a whole did irreparable damage to his reputation. The theories of Vichy and Allied co-operation, 
of Vichy's own plans to liberate France, and of Vichy and Gaullist collaboration hindered de Gaulle. The 
people who he wanted to recruit or gain support from would not be attracted to de Gaulle if it seemed that 
he was a Vichy croney, or that he was not recognised by any other nations. One saving grace for de Gaulle 
was that by Vichy's capitulation in Syria, he could rightly claim that the Vichy regime had surrendered its 
French sovereignty and he had saved it; another was that the more unpopular that Vichy became, the less 
likely that the 'double game' theory was deemed true by the French public. 
Vichy's propaganda tactics were used to great effect against de Gaulle and the Allies and to promote their 
own policies. Their methods of self-promotion were sometimes viewed as ingenious. The organised visits 
by Petain to southern towns were, on the whole, a resounding success. Vichy also used the propaganda of 
the 'glorious' French Empire to better their reputation. It is very difficult to ascertain how much of this self-
promoting image-making propaganda the public believed in but Petain still seemed popular in the spring of 
1944. 
Petain and his government used a variety of methods on a variety of different subjects to destroy the 
reputation of their adversaries, the British and de Gaulle. Their main methods were newspapers, posters and 
the radio. Newspapers played on the British abandoning France at Dunkirk and on them taking up arms 
against the French forces at Dakar. The Vichy press called Britain and the Gaullists of Dakar "the forces of 
dissidence". Their anti-British propaganda would contribute to the decrease in support for de Gaulle. 
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However, it was the direct propaganda against his movement and himself which would cause most harm 
to de Gaulle. The radio was used to good effect, especially when it came to broadcasting Vichy government 
speeches. A report by the Foreign Office illustrates the lengths that Vichy broadcasts would go to to 
discredit de Gaulle: -
'Vichy's new anti-de Gaulle campaign began with a talk on the signing of the Armistice in which the 
General was represented as a British agent. [The second talk was on Mers-ei-Kebir]. The next talk dealt 
with the General's role in the British plan to separate France from her colonial Empire. The fourth talk 
describes how the different territories had joined the General, representing their adhesion as due to British 
bribes, piracy and de Gaullist acts of rebellion. The fifth talk attacked the General's speeches and 
propaganda. The fmal talk by Petain boosted national unity' 105• 
Vichy radio broadcasts were backed up by the Vichy-controlled press of the unoccupied zone. In the 
'Censure Cons ignes generales permanente pour la Presse', guidelines were issued by Vichy to the press. 
Two of them were 'Ne rien Iaisser passer sur de Gaulle et les emigres en dehors des communications 
officielles' and 'les depeches O.F.I. sur les emissions de la radio fran~aise en reponse a la dissidence 
doivent etre inserees obligatoirement en bonne place' 106• Other newspaper reports branded Charles de 
Gaulle as an 'anti-France', a traitor, a British assassin, and supporter of capitalism and Jewry' 107. Vichy 
pamphlets were distributed which blamed the Gaullists for various atrocities 108• Furthermore, the Vichy 
Government issued anti-Gaullist measures which started the legal process of rounding up Gaullists, 
imprisoning them and shooting them 109• This propaganda stiffened the resolve of many Vichy soldiers to 
seek revenge on the Anglo-Gaullists110• It acted as a deterrent toward would-be Gaullists. 
However, the effect of Vichy propaganda on the public was more than one-sided. Even though Vichy did 
not realise it, they were effectively promoting de Gaulle by actively discouraging people to support him. 
They also aided de Gaulle in negotiations. According to Passy in September 1942, 'les attaques de la radio 
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de Vichy, accusant le general de Gaulle d'avoir livre Madagascar aux Anglais, confmnerent celui-ci, s'il en 
etait besoin, dans sa position, et lui donnerent un argument supp!ementaire vis-a-vis des Anglais' 111 . When 
Hitler mentioned in a speech how things would be different in England without de Gaulle in the way, he 
was unintentionally personifying de Gaulle as a rebel with a cause 112. This speech would do no harm to the 
General's reputation. Furthermore, de Gaulle was able to change people's perceptions of him or at least 
question their reasoning. After the Vichy government had added to the dubiousness of the General's cause 
in August 1940 by condemning him to death, de Gaulle replied, 'I consider the act of the men of Vichy as 
entirely void. I shall have a settlement of accounts with them after the victory' 113 • This response was good 
publicity and propaganda for the Free French, it questioned the ruling and legality of the Vichy regime, and 
it turned the tables on the Vichy propagandists and on French public opinion at that time. 
The propaganda in the southern zone newspapers was not as extreme and harsh as its counterparts in the 
northern zone according to Henri Amouroux. The commentaries and headlines were more measured and 
subdued, and some of their articles on the Vichy government were censored suggesting that they were 
providing too many real details and not sticking to Vichy censorship rules"4. This may be part of the 
reason why Jean-Pierre Azema and Olivier Wievorka believe that Vichy was successful until 1942. They 
have stated that 'jusqu'en 1942, l'Etat fran~ais n'avait prete qu'une attention distraite a la dissidence"' 5 
and that even though they took this attitude, they were hardly untroubled by Resistance and saboteurs' 
activities. According to Azema and Wievorka, this situation changed in 1942 with the acquired audience of 
the BBC counterbalancing the effectiveness ofVichyist propaganda. The French public soon became aware 
of Vichy and German propaganda and would rather read underground newspapers and listen to British and 
American radio broadcasts to get a truer picture of the daily news 116. Opinions may have been formed by 
the French population on de Gaulle that relied on instinct and prejudices rather than hard facts. Propaganda 
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would have played its part but the perceptions that people obtained from word-of-mouth, neutral or non-
Vichy news reports and radio broadcasts may also have tarnished or preserved de Gaulle's good name. 
Far from only responding to Vichy statements and actions, Charles de Gaulle actively engaged in 
undermining them from the very beginning of his stay in London. This may have at first turned the general 
public against him. By insulting the Petain Government, the Free French were possibly making it worse for 
the government at the negotiating table with the Nazis. Support for de Gaulle in France made the Nazis 
aware that Petain's government was not seen by all Frenchmen in the free zone as the legitimate authority 
and this discredited its belief that it could convince Hitler that it could stop the fighting, that it could 
maintain law and order in a free zone, in the French Empire and with a reduced army and navy. 
On the other hand, Paul Baudouin thought that de Gaulle was threatening the neutrality of Vichy and that 
'England and de Gaulle could not have acted differently had they wished to get round the armistice, to 
strengthen the hands of the Anglophobes and to throw the French government into the arms of 
Germany' 117• Some Frenchmen may have agreed with this statement. De Gaulle may have been viewed by 
the French public as an uncompromising man who had shown no attempt to foster relations with the Vichy 
government; Vichy may have looked to some as the innocent party. At the time of the defeat, it was 
generally deemed unpatriotic to believe that Britain would not capitulate to the Germans, thereby implying 
that Britain was better than France. Due to the fact that the majority of Frenchmen were certain of Vichy's 
legality, this made de Gaulle a seditionist. 
De Gaulle's activities in the French Empire were a mixed blessing to both his movement and to the Vichy 
regime. Weygand thought that de Gaulle tried to tarnish Vichy's reputation so much that he seriously 
threatened their potential allies, especially Britain. He believed that the power that de Gaulle possessed, to 
use radio and newspapers for his own ends, would create a barrier between the British and the Vichy 
regime 118• Some people believed that the real resistance were the Vichy troops fighting in Dakar and Syria 
and not the self-exiled traitors of de Gaulle's Free French movement. Others would view the Syrian war in 
1941 as de Gaulle striking a blow against the corrupt Vichy authorities, but the majority of people accepted 
Vichy's view that de Gaulle had simply reneged on his promise that Frenchmen would not fight against 
117 Baudouin, Private Diaries, p.207. 
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other Frenchmen. In fact, the antipathy that the Vichy regime felt for de Gaulle caused him extra problems 
in Syria because Gaullist representatives were excluded from the negotiations at Acre apparently because 
the British feared that this might cause General Dentz to prolong the fighting. This would be a permanent 
source of contention between the Gaullists and British. Furthermore, the existence of the Free French 
movement strengthened Vichy's hand in one sense. The threat that de Gaulle posed over the Empire helped 
to destroy Hitler's plan of a grand coalition which all depended upon a distribution of the spoils which the 
French Empire was expected to provide. With the maintenance of the Empire under direct control from 
Vichy, they were able to bargain with the Germans that, 'if Vichy were to counter the Gaullist threat, it 
must have not only a clear promise that the French Empire would remain French, but also the military 
means to make its authority effective' 119• The French Navy was able to join the fight for neutrality by 
preventing their ships from joining the Allied cause and threatening action against British and American 
possessions if an attempt was made to seize their vessels 120• The subsequent rearmament of all French 
forces was viewed by many Frenchmen as a positive sign that Vichy would defend the troubled French 
Empire and may re-enter the war against the Axis. On the other hand, it could lead to further collaboration 
between Vichy and the Germans. 
The Free French movement's activities also affected the politics of Vichy. It has been stated that Gaullist 
blunders such as Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir in 1940 aided the anti-Gaullist Admiral Darlan to become Vice-
Premier. The propaganda and activities that the Gaullists were actively engaged in put off many men who 
could well have been strong allies. If de Gaulle had been more restrained, Weygand might have taken him a 
lot more seriously. Weygand was not averse to the idea of France rising again to fight offthe Germans and 
re-join the Allies 121 . De Gaulle sent letters to Vichy dignitaries including Weygand asking for their support 
or even their leadership. This may have done serious damage to de Gaulle's quest for legitimacy and to his 
reputation. De Gaulle falsely believed for two months from December 1940 that the Vichy government 
might have rescued itself from out-and-out collaboration. The reprieve that de Gaulle gave to Vichy at this 
time could only benefit the Petain regime and possibly divide the support of his own movement. 
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The Vichy government caused severe problems for de Gaulle and the Free French. They used 
propaganda methods to make de Gaulle look like a traitor and make themselves look better in the process. 
The Vichy government may have shown themselves up by working so deviously against de Gaulle but the 
more people that heard bad rumours about de Gaulle, the more they were likely to be inclined to accept 
them. De Gaulle knew that his struggle to win public support in the free zone and to alienate the Vichy 
regime would be terribly difficult. His direct adversary, Vichy, had been accepted by the majority of the 
southern French population in the summer of 1940. Petain would remain popular at least until the total 
occupation of France. The problem that Petain was soon to regret was that his government was weak, 
directionless and that it was rotten to the core; his most eminent ministers were usually happy to collaborate 
fully with the Nazis. Petain could only remain popular for so long until his government would drag him 
down as captain of a sinking ship. De Gaulle could not rival Petain as ofNovember 1942 but was preparing 
himself for his possible succession to the throne. 
To conclude, Vichy was the lynchpin upon which much of de Gaulle's support in unoccupied France 
depended. Their popularity and unpopularity equally affected the Gaullist movement. By the summer of 
1942, de Gaulle amassed a great deal of support from people either disgusted or unhappy with 
collaboration. The Vichy regime was generally unpopular and de Gaulle was able to say on the radio what 
many Frenchmen only thought. People were apprehensive about resisting the Germans but they were also 
looking forward to the day when the Germans would leave. In the free zone, the Vichy government was 
seen as a temporary buffer between the French people and the Germans. Once the Allies had defeated the 
Axis powers, there was no doubt in many people's minds that a replacement for Vichy would need to be 
found and de Gaulle was beginning to prove to be a worthy successor. 
De Gaulle's total rejection of Vichy and its policies and the consequences that his anti-Vichy activities 
entailed only existed because Vichy existed. 'Without Vichy colonies to win over, without Vichy soldiers 
and sailors to enlist, without a Vichy armistice to condemn, without Vichy statesmen to castigate, without 
Vichy laws to protest against, of what use would the Gaullist movement have been?' 122 De Gaulle would 
make some mistakes after violently attacking Vichy on the radio which at first engendered bitterness 
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among the French population, but would also turn Vichy policy to his own advantage. However, he had 
little influence over the public opinion ofPetain and his government until 1942 and would suffer from their 
popularity and benefit in turn from their fall~ from grace. By the summer of 1942, the Vichy regime was in 
decline, had rejected de Gaulle and was collaborating actively with the Nazis; the Free French movement 
had the means to capitalise on this. The fortunes of the Vichy government had an enormous impact on the 
support for Gaullism in unoccupied France. 
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The British and other external influences on Gaullist support in France 
There were many advertent and inadvertent ways in which external influences affected support for the 
Gaullists in unoccupied France. The British, American and Russians each had their own agenda regarding 
foreign policy and were all selfish in their dealings with others to guarantee their own national security. 
They also had their own views on de Gaulle which they exhibited freely. In this chapter, a study will be 
made of the external influences affecting Gaullist support including the British ventures in France, 
Churchill's influence over the Free French, the relationship between de Gaulle and the British, the 
relationship between de Gaulle and the Americans and Russians, and the effect of these influences on the 
people of unoccupied France. The significance of all these factors will be assessed. 
There are various opinions and theories on how the Gaullists could have dealt with their external 
influences and vice versa. Vice-Admiral Muselier believed that full co-operation with the Allies would 
have made de Gaulle more popular in unoccupied France and throughout the world. De Gaulle believed in 
limited co-operation with the Allies because he thought that his independence was essential if he was to 
gain support in France. William Langer thought that de Gaulle was not co-operative enough to be of any 
use to the Allies and was not popular enough in metropolitan France 123 . These theories would be put to the 
test in the first two years of the war. 
The relationship between the United States and de Gaulle was very important to the French people. 
Although it seems de Gaulle did not court the support of the Americans, he was well aware of the effect 
that American recognition would have on his Free French movement. Pierre Cot explains that the 
Americans' 'popularity in France cannot be overestimated .... The captive and suffering French people trust 
them. The French nation, as a whole, has complete confidence in the official declaration of the government 
of the United States. For them America .. .is the land of refuge and liberty; it is the vanguard of 
democracy' 124 . 
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From the defeat of France in the summer of 1940, the Americans had recognised Petain's Vichy 
Government as the legitimate authority in France. They maintained diplomatic relations with Vichy, as did 
Russia, Italy, Japan, Spain and Canada. In December 1940, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt displayed 
his trust in Vichy by appointing a high-ranking close friend, Admiral William Leahy, as Ambassador to the 
Marshal. Leahy proved to be an ardent Anglophobe who worked well with the Vichy government. The 
American attitude of scepticism towards the Free French led many high-ranking English politicians to 
question the legitimacy of the Gaullist movement. However, there was some speculation as to whether the 
Americans would transfer their support over to de Gaulle. In two articles from the Daily Express in 1941, 
this speculation was backed up by American threats. The Express reported that America's Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, warned Vichy that a breach of diplomatic relations would take place if Darlan allowed 
France to collaborate more closely with the Nazis 125.1t also reported that 'the moment Petain's Government 
began to grant port concessions to the Germans the American Government was expected to start sending 
direct aid to the Free French forces in Africa. This would greatly encourage Free French movements 
outside France and Free French sentiment inside Franced26 • On the other hand, these threats were made in 
order to halt Vichy collaboration and to sustain diplomatic relations between the United States and Vichy. 
Free France was of much less interest to Roosevelt than Vichy which still held on to its Fleet and Empire. 
Both Hull and Roosevelt also viewed de Gaulle as ambitious, overweening and dangerous especially since 
the Dakar fiasco 127• 
The Americans frowned upon the views and policies of de Gaulle and vice-versa. The General was 
worried about American foreign policy regarding France. In a telegram to Churchill in late 1941, de Gaulle 
stated, 'I have every reason to fear that the State Department's present attitude with regard to the Free 
French and to Vichy may do a great deal of harm to the fighting spirit in France and elsewhere. I dread the 
unfortunate impression on public opinion that will be produced by the United States' government's 
preference for those responsible for the surrender and who are guilty of collaboration' 128 . The Americans 
found it very difficult to accept de Gaulle as a political leader rather than as a military chief. This opinion 
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was not without substance; up until June 1942, de Gaulle had not clearly set out his political ideology. 
Influential American figures in France also coloured the State Department's opinion of de Gaulle. In a 
private letter in 1942 from Douglas Macarthur, Secretary ofthe U.S. Embassy at Vichy, to Mr. Matthews at 
the Foreign Office, it was mentioned that 'Gaullism as a political movement is no more popular than 
before. As a military movement it is fine. If in case of a disembarkation your Free French friends expect to 
come over and run the government, there will be trouble with a capital 'T'. This feeling may change but I 
don't see any immediate prospect of it. I do not mean by this that the Free French could not be represented. 
I do mean they can't run the French side ofthe show.I29 . The Americans found some of his policies very 
difficult to comprehend especially the forceful takeover of the North Atlantic island of St. Pierre-et-
Miquelon in 1942. De Gaulle suspected that Vichy had installed a radio-transmitting station to guide 
German submarines so they took the French island without firing a single shot. However, the Americans 
were furious with de Gaulle's interference in their strategies. The island was close to the North American 
coast and de Gaulle had taken over the island without giving prior warning to the Americans. Also during 
this time, the Americans may have been actively working against the Gaullists. From late 1940, numerous 
eminent Frenchmen who distrusted de Gaulle were welcomed by Washington. In the winter of 1941-1942, 
some Free Frenchmen suspected that the Americans were trying to buy their friends away from them so 
that they could join the existing French exiles in America. In 1942, the Americans were in favour of 
General Giraud becoming leader of the French. 
However during 1942 the Free French began to come into favour in Washington. After Pearl Harbour in 
December 1941, the Americans joined the Allies and were therefore comrades-in-arms with the Free 
French. The Americans' first step towards recognition was taken with an agreement between the United 
States and the Free French in July 1942. By September 1942, the American State and War Departments 
realised that de Gaulle was totally committed to the Allied cause, that he was now an important figure in 
France, and that the Free French were popular and Vichy unpopular in American public opinion. They 
thought that his support in France could well increase and were concerned that delaying recognition of de 
Gaulle might prove damaging to the United States in the future. Their opinions rubbed off on the ordinary 
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Frenchman's view of de Gaulle. The French people valued the opinion of the Americans very highly. 
Vichy would suffer from their fall from grace in American eyes. 
The relationship between Russia and de Gaulle was extremely different. From the moment that 
Germany made war against Russia, the Russian politicians were extremely welcoming to the Free French. 
However, the talks in 1941 between the two were a mixed blessing for the Free French movement. There 
were many disadvantages. De Gaulle knew that an alliance with Russia would lose him a great deal of 
sympathy and support and many of the undecided French people who had a choice between Vichy and de 
Gaulle recoiled away from supporting the Free French. People were frightened of the repercussions that a 
Soviet alliance would bring to de Gaulle and the French people. The collaborationist French newspapers 
and Vichy propaganda transformed the caricatures of de Gaulle from an ultra-capitalist fmanced by the City 
of London to a vassal in the service of the Russians 130• De Gaulle made an agreement with the Soviet Union 
in late 1941 and followed this up w!th a speech glorifying the Russian cause. This was seen by some anti-
Gaullists as an act of obedience 131 • Ultimately, de Gaulle had to decide who to support between the 
Americans and the Russians. Up until November 1942, de Gaulle's policy to appear supportive to both was 
not popular with the Americans who wanted him to decide which of the two Powers he was going to back 
wholeheartedly. 
However, the Free French benefited substantially from establishing cordial relations with the Russians. 
In May 1942, de Gaulle was recognised by the Soviet Union as the "symbol of France". When de Gaulle 
renamed his movement Fighting France in July 1942, Russia gave him its wholehearted support. It 
recognised 'la France Combattante' as the 'totality of French citizens and territories not recognizing the 
capitulation and contributing anywhere and by every means to the liberation of France' 132. An alliance with 
Stalin would certainly win de Gaulle many supporters. The Russians had provided the legitimacy that de 
Gaulle had been waiting for; the British and Americans had recognised Fighting France in much less 
explicit terms. Even though Russia was feared by many French people, Stalin's recognition of the Gaullists 
would enhance de Gaulle's international standing and subsequently his standing within unoccupied France. 
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In 1942, Russia was still feared less than Germany; most people in Britain thought ofthem as Allies first 
and Communists second. They were not feared as much as they were during the Cold War and therefore an 
alliance with the Soviet Union was not viewed as political suicide in the West. 
Support for Gaullism was also influenced by the actions of the British. The Gaullist movement was 
associated with Britain and was affected by matters of which they had no control over such as the Dunkirk 
evacuation. This incident occurred one month before de Gaulle's first 'appel' in June 1940. The British 
were criticised for supporting the vast French Army with a small expeditionary force, for not being well-
equipped, for being too much in a hurry to leave, for not providing all air support available, for saving 
British soldiers in preference to French soldiers, and for treacherously leaving the French to their doom 133 . 
The British were widely viewed as cowards by French public opinion and all of this rubbed off on the 
reputation of the Free French. They were compared to British Dunkirk evacuees; in other words, their 
concern was not for the French people but for themselves. They were also viewed as 'friends of the 
British', the same British people who had left France to fight alone against the Germans. 
One of the early problems that the Free French Movement experienced was their unsuccessful attempt 
to recruit Frenchmen to the Gaullist cause. This has already been discussed above in the Mers-el-Kebir 
chapter but there were more hindrances to de Gaulle's recruitment campaign including the British who 
seemed determined to see the evacuated French soldiers and sailors return to France. Thousands of 
Frenchmen were kept in internment camps in the most unsanitary conditions. Many of these men had left 
their jobs, their families and their homeland to come to Britain only to be forgotten about in a 'prison' 
camp supervised by English soldiers who had recently made a 'cowardly' escape from Dunkirk and who 
were 'murdering' French sailors in the Mediterranean Sea. Some Frenchmen chose to return to France on 
the ship the 'Meknes' but were sunk by the Germans in spite of plenty of warnings from the British. The 
Germans proclaimed that the British sunk the ship and the Frenchmen believed it. 
The British and Free French clashed over direction in the camps. The problem lay in the Free French 
jealousy of British resistance against the Nazis and the British feeling of superiority over the French 
expecting them to nearly bow in deference. The Free French desperately wanted the British to thwart the 
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common enemy but also felt a deep sense of shame for the actions of their own nation and it gave them an 
over-reactive inferiority complex when questions of sovereignty arose. The British actively discouraged 
Free French recruitment because it might make Petain and Weygand more anti-British and their view 
counted at that time. The United States had not warmed to the Free French and the British did not want to 
be seen recruiting for them 134• Once the internees were set free, many were as anti-British and 
collaborationist as Vichy's finest. Their stories of ill-treatment like those of Georges Blond became 
excellent propaganda material 135 • 
When the British forces, in collaboration with the Gaullists, began to venture into the French Empire 
and assert their influence over it, they became very unpopular with many people in the unoccupied zone. 
The French public had been told by Petain that they must cherish the French Navy and the French Empire, 
the only assets that the Nazis let Vichy France hold on to. When the British 'threatened' the glorious 
French Empire, they came to be seen by many French people as the real enemy. One view which was quite 
widely accepted was that 'De Gaulle est surtout coupable de permettre aux Anglais de s'emparer de 
territoires de !'Empire que, on est convaincu a Vichy, ils ne rendront jamais' 136• Another view blamed de 
Gaulle for the sole actions of the British. It was as if he was the instigator behind all the British ventures 
abroad involving French interests. The most accepted view was that the British were trying to gain control 
over the French Empire and this in turn damaged de Gaulle's reputation simply by his association with the 
British or more clearly by his collaboration with the British. Of course, the French public did not 
universally accept all of the above views. There were some people who believed that British intervention in 
French imperial interests was a good thing. 
These contrasting views are best illustrated in the case of the British conflict in Syria in 1941. 
Weygand, amongst others, was disgusted that de Gaulle would stoop so low as to fight other Frenchmen 
after both de Gaulle and Churchill promised that an incident like that would never happen 137• Henri Dentz, 
the High Commissioner in Syria, shared his opinion 138 . Public opinion was mostly in agreement according 
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to Foreign Office sources 139• The way that the British treated the Free French after Dentz agreed to an 
armistice in July 1941 made them look like they were solely taking over effective control in Syria. It also 
made de Gaulle look like a fool for trusting the British and for following their selfish cause. Vice-Admiral 
Muselier believed that, 'les difficultes graves survenues avec le gouvernement britannique apropos de 
l'affaire de Syrie, le menace faite par de Gaulle de rompre !'alliance avec le Grande Bretagne, son 
interview maladroit et injuste [American press], l'acceptation inadmissible des conditions navales de 
!'armistice de Syrie, les methodes de pouvoir personnel employees vis-a-vis de nos allies mettaient en 
danger !'alliance anglaise et les interets supremes de la France' 140. He wanted to see further collaboration 
between the British and de Gaulle because he believed that the Gaullists would be ineffectual without 
British support. This fragile collaboration was always on the brink of disbanding 141 . The Free French 
defence at Bir-Hakeim in May and June 1942 changed many people's opinions in unoccupied France. The 
Free French were actively fighting against the Germans for the cause of the liberation of France. It was 
widely known, via the BBC, of the exploits of the Free French. The RAF distributed two million leaflets 
about the 'victory' over France and even Radio Paris mentioned it142 . De Gaulle was able to redeem himself 
with British support. 
The British became influential in French resistance circles. They formed their own French underground 
under the title Special Operations Executive. There was a great rivalry between the SOE and the BCRA, 
Free French Intelligence. Both tried to recruit the same newly arrived French people in London. The SOE 
let many Frenchmen believe that they were working for Free France but were really working for the 
British. They also tried to lure French resistance organisations with their promise of supplies and money, 
something that the Free French lacked the means to do. SOE's parachute drops of arms and funds began in 
June 1941. The Gaullists started their drops in January 1942. The RAF dropped propaganda leaflets from 
the Free French over French mainland and this greatly benefited de Gaulle's movement. However, they 
also dropped British leaflets to further their own resistance activities 143 . Questions have been asked about 
139 FO 371 28273 Z5507 Mr. Robertson (British Embassy, Lisbon) to Mr. Makins (F.O.) 24/06/41 'Conditions in France'. Reports a 
talk with M. Pancifieu (formerly First Secretary of the French Legation in Lisbon; was in Vichy for several months). 
140 Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p.226. 
141 PREM 3/120/1 'Position of de Gaulle vis-a-vis His Majesty's Government: Memorandum of Agreement (7 August 1940) 11 (6)' by 
Sir Desmond Morton to Churchill. 
142 Cremieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, p.367. 
143 Daily Mirror (16 July 1940), p.4. 
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the British resistance actions in the past, such as was their policy a purely military policy to maintain 
control of their forces including the Gaullists, a political policy to remove support for de Gaulle, or was it 
just a dislike and distrust of the Free French movement? No one has drawn any reasonable conclusions to 
these questions 144• However, the British Secret Service had a great deal more contacts and was more active 
in France than the Free French organisation. This rivalry between the external resistance caused confusion 
and apprehension among possible resisters and the Vichy French public. It also worried possible Gaullist 
supporters who questioned Britain's commitment to Free France. The British were effectively undermining 
de Gaulle's authority. 
A great proportion of French people opposed the RAF and Allied bombing of French industrial areas 
and towns. They felt as if they were being blamed for the actions of the Germans. In a Prefect's report, one 
person's opinion was that 'jamais, les Allemands n'ont commis de telles atrocitesd 45 . However, it has been 
stated that 'la grande majorite des Franc;ais approuvait les bombardements de la RAF' 146 and this was 
because it was a state of war and it was necessary to try and destroy German military strength 147• People 
became very anti-British when they were bombed by the RAF but would soon excuse the British actions 
and support the liberation of France. The bombing raids undoubtedly affected support for Gaullism in the 
free zone but to a lesser degree than in the occupied zone which bore the brunt of allied raids. De Gaulle 
may not have lost much support if we are to believe the prefects' reports; he could also not be blamed 
directly for the raids. 
The relationship between de Gaulle and the British was not an easy one; it was certainly not helped by 
de Gaulle's intransigence. As defender of French sovereignty and French equality with other major powers, 
de Gaulle became unpopular with the British and exacerbated the Cabinet. De Gaulle did not accept the 
view that 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'. As Georges Bidault puts it, 'when the English discovered how 
144 Refer to Blake Ehrlich, The French Resistance 1940-45 (London, 1966), pp.50-1. Crawley, De Gaulle, pp.186-7 believes it to be a 
purely military policy decision. 
145 AD HG 1896-159, rapport du commissaire special au prefet regional, 7 mars 1942 quoted in Laborie, L'Opinion Francaise, pp.264-
265. 
146 Jacques Benoist-Mechin, 'De la defaite au desastre les occasions manquees', p.389 quoted in Laborie, L'Opinion Francaise, 
pp.264-265. Also refer to FO 371 24314 Cl2516 His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon sends Minute by Naval Attache H. D. Owen (25 
November, 1940):- 'Public Opinion in France' (a). 
147 AD HG 3578-2 quoted in Laborie, L'Opinion Francaise, pp.264-265. 
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inflexible he was, they probably regretted all the publicity they had given himd48. This caused unease 
between the British and the Free French and also made a break with the British more possible. The 
politicians in London grew to hate de Gaulle on occasions because they believed that France's only hope 
for the future lay in British victory but de Gaulle seemed to be working against them at times. Churchill 
worked against de Gaulle at times and thought seriously about withdrawing British support from the Free 
French 149. There are disagreements as to the effect of losing British support. Georges Bidault seems to 
contradict himself by saying if the English had been tempted to get rid of de Gaulle, 'it would not have hurt 
de Gaulle's position at all; on the contrary. But without the English radio, de Gaulle would never have been 
anything more than a minor leader' 150• De Gaulle was very worried about losing support. During the Sudan 
crisis, he wrote to Churchill that 'si, ... notre action commune en Syrie et au Liban semblait avoir pour 
resultat d'y diminuer la position de la France et d'y introduire des tendances et une action proprement 
britannique,je suis convaincu que l'effet sur !'opinion demon pays serait desastreux' 151 . 
Within the terms of the Anglo-Gaullist declaration of23 June 1940 and the agreement between de 
Gaulle and Churchill on 7 August 1940, the French National Committee was recognised by the British 
Government who also supplied buildings, money and equipment for the Free French. The British aided de 
Gaulle in his empire-building in return for military assistance and they also believed that he would be 
listened to by the French people; without a genuine French presence, the British Government would be 
constantly suspected of spouting propaganda and would not fare well on their own. Britain's long-term 
policy in Europe was to restore France as a Great Power. De Gaulle was therefore an important figure in 
post-war planning and the Foreign Office appreciated this. In fact, the Foreign Office became a strong 
supporter of the Free French movement. General Spears believed that 'our only hope of keeping the French 
nation from coming in against us was to have a force, however small, fighting with us' 152. As Winston 
Churchill puts it, 'we did our utmost to increase his [de Gaulle's] influence, authority and 
148 Bidault, Resistance, p.21. 
149 PREM 3/120/lOA, FR (42) 37 War Cabinet, Committee on French Resistance, 11 September 1942 and PREM 3/120/6 1942 
'Relations with de Gaulle'. 
150 Bidault, Resistance, p.21. 
151 Telegramme du general de Gaulle a M. W. Churchill a Londres (le Caire, 28juin 1941) quoted in De Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre 
I, pp.432. 
152 Mary Borden (Lady Spears), 'Journey down a Blind Alley' (New York and London, 1946), p.l51 quoted in Hytier, Two Years of 
French Foreign Policy. p.80. 
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power. ... Whatever Vichy might do for good or ill, we would not abandon de Gaulle or discourage 
accessions to his growing colonial domain' 153 . 
This support for de Gaulle and the Free French was somewhat offset by the British Government's 
willingness to seek an understanding with the Vichy Government. Some British representatives such as M. 
Parr believed that the Free French would suffer: 'Chaque marque de courtoisie et de tolerance, chaque 
concession et facilite accordee aux gens de Vichy, affaiblissent les Franr;:ais Libres, sement la perplexite et 
le decouragement dans !'opinion en France et dans !'Empire et contribuent a affermir l'ennemi. La France 
Libre s'eteindrait si le peuple franr;:ais devait en arriver a la conclusion que nous respectons Vichy et que 
nous sommes prets a !'aider au detriment des Franr;:ais combattants. Le peuple, dans ce cas, se resignerait a 
la victoire allemande"54. The British Government wanted to reach an agreement with Vichy in order to 
keep the French Fleet, bases and colonial produce out of Germany's grasp but would have to disown de 
Gaulle and his organisation. The British considered and eventually dismissed rumours and supposed Vichy 
intentions to come to an agreement about France re-entering the war. These Vichy intentions included the 
Louis Rougier affair and the Baudouin message to Sir Samuel Hoare. Churchill later explained that 'our 
consistent policy was to make the Vichy Government and its members feel that, so far as we were 
concerned, it was never too late to mend. Whatever had happened in the past, France was our comrade in 
tribulation, and nothing but actual war between us should prevent her being our partner in victory' 155 . How 
serious the probability of an Anglo-Vichy agreement was and is open to question but judging by some 
Vichy politicians' opinions, it was a far-fetched idea156• 
The effect that the relationship between the Allies and de Gaulle had on the people in the unoccupied 
zone was substantial. Firstly, their relationship contributed to the growing unpopularity of the Vichy 
Government. Secondly, many people in France came to distrust the Allies. After de Gaulle and Andre 
Labarthe called for French engineers and technicians to join them in London in the summer of 1940, some 
people were uncertain whether to go because they were worried in case the British would lose the war. The 
153 Churchill, Second World War Vol. II, pp.450-l, 454. Also refer to Telegrarnme de M. W. Churchill au general de Gaulle au Caire 
(Londres, 4 avrill941) quoted in De Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre I, p.385. 
154 Telegrarnme de M. Parr, Consul general britannique a Brazzaville, adresse au Foreign Office et communique au general de Gaulle 
(Traduction) (Brazzaville, 13 mai 1941) quoted in De Gaulle, Memoires de Guerre I, pp.402-3. 
155 Churchill, Second World War Vol. Il, p.450. 
156 
'Ordre dujour adresse par I'arniral Darlan aux Forces Maritimes Fran9aises (24 September 1940) quoted in Coutau-Begarie and 
Huan (eds.), Lettres et notes de I'Amiral Darlan, p.235. 
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British had planned that if they defeated the Germans, the Free French would be triumphant. No one had 
explained what would happen to the Free French if the British lost. This caused unease with possible 
Gaullists and support was thin on the ground for the first few months. Communist Pierre Varillon wrote 
before June 1941 that Gaullism would be 'swept away and it will be useful to us if we give the country 
freedom, peace and bread ... before Britain arrives to do so' 157. A section of French were distrustful of the 
British regarding the Jews:- 'All Frenchmen welcome the measures against the Jews and their only fear of 
a British victory is that Britain will insist on the restoration of Jewish privileges' 158• Sir Samuel Hoare 
reported that the people in unoccupied France believed that neither side could win and a compromise peace 
for one or two years would be favorable; they therefore did not believe that de Gaulle would be 
victorious 159• 
Other people in unoccupied France were or became anti-British and anti-Allies; they hated the Allies 
rather than distrusting them. In June 1940, Churchill's broadcast to the French people to aid the British 
Government in achieving victory was unpopular with a lot of French people who believed that the British 
had not assisted the French in their time of need and were trying to divide the French by promoting de 
Gaulle at a time when the French people sought solace in the arms ofPetain. Many young people could not 
support Britain because they thought Britain was fighting for the survival of capitalism 160. Letters from 
unoccupied France expressed anti-British sentiment. According to the Foreign Office compiler, the 
strongest factor in French opinion in Aprill941 was 'a feeling that the war is now none of France's 
business, and that other Frenchmen should concentrate on National Recovery and leave England and 
Germany to exhaust each other, so that when the war is over a regenerated France will be able to take the 
lead in Europe' 161 . 
However, from the evidence that has been gathered, it would seem that the majority of French people 
slowly began to follow and support the Allies. According to Pierre Laborie, the reason people started to 
157 Pierre Varillon, 'Resistant de la premiere heure' (Paris, 1983), pp.l82-4 quoted in Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Rebel, p.373. 
158 FO 371 24314 Cl2156 His Majesty's Ambassador at Lisbon (25 November 1940) sends Minute by Naval Attache H. D. Owen: 
'Public opinion in France'- views by Captain Colbert. 
159 FO 371 28268 1941 France File No.45 Z807 Sir Samuel Hoare (Madrid) 'Report on conditions in France', given by French 
Minister to Portugal (02/02/41 ). 
160 Halls, The Youth of Vichy France, p.396. 
161 FO 371 28272 Z4320 Imperial Censorship, Trinidad (12/04/41) 'Report on public opinion in France'. Refer to specific letters:- R. 
(Ciuny, France) toR (Chicago, USA) 18/03/41, MJP (St. Martian d'Artenset, France) to J.C. (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil) 18/03/41 and 
R.R. (Marseille, France) to R.V. (Basseterre, Guadeloupe) 09/03/41. 
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support the Allies was less to do with the fact that they wanted them to be victorious than by their attitude 
to the Germans. Their hatred of the Germans was so aggressive that it made them support Britain and its 
allies 162• Albert Vulliez, a captain in the French Navy, backs this up by stating that young sailors replaced 
the old Anglophobes in the Navy. 'Les jeunes ... semblaient n'avoir qu'un desir: partir unjour vers 
I'Angleterre.I 63 . According to Foreign Office reports in 1940 there was a general pro-British feeling in 
unoccupied France. In fact, one report mentions that '80% are now definitely pro-British' 164. As early as 
August 1940, German police and Clermont-Ferrand police reported that the French population 'preferred to 
listen to British radio.I 65 . By 1941, reports are even more positive about French opinion in the free zone 
towards the British166• The entry of America into the war and the North African landings swayed people's 
opinions over to the Allied camp. By 1942, the Allies were becoming more popular. Vichy propaganda 
posters in unoccupied France were defaced with 'V' signs for 'Victory' and some actually defaced Petain's 
image. An example of this is on page fifty-four. Other graffiti included 'V.V.RAF' (Victory to the RAF) 167• 
Even de Gaulle admitted that the British were very popular in France 168• 
The side-effect of British and Allies' popularity was the increased support for de Gaulle. He was 
intrinsically linked with the fortunes of the Allies and when they were mentioned, he was also invariably 
mentioned in the same sentence. However, de Gaulle could not satisfy every Frenchman's requirements. In 
1942, some of the pro-British Frenchmen such as Muselier did not like the idea that de Gaulle was trying to 
become independent of the British. The anti-British Frenchmen did not like the idea that de Gaulle was 
allied to the British. It would seem that he could not win. By 1942, de Gaulle was trying to appear as an 
independent leader at the same time that the French were increasing their support for the Allies. Support for 
de Gaulle had been affected greatly by anti-Allied propaganda in 1940 but his independence meant that 
162 Laborie, L'Opinion Francaise, p.240. 
163 Vulliez, Mers-el-Kebir, p.318. 
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unoccupied France (18 November 1940). Also refer to C12573 and C12516 (a) and (d). 
165 Quote from Militllrverwaltung bezirk B, 11-19/08/1940. In File RW35/1254 V.l 070, Militararchiv, Freiburg. Also refer to 
Commissaire de Police du 3e Arrondissement a Monsieur le Prefet du PdD, Rapport moral mensuel d'order general, No.3765 
(25/11140) and Prefet a Monsieur le Ministre de l'lnterieur (11/11/40)- both in M03822. All quoted from Sweets, Choices in Vichy 
France, p.l44. 
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much of the glory later bestowed on the Allies was not directed at him. On the other hand, his very 
independence may have been his strongest asset until the liberation. It is very difficult to determine what 
the relationship between de Gaulle and Churchill consisted of and it is even more difficult to estimate what 
influence the relationship between the Free French and the Allies had on public opinion in France. Russian 
and American support was invaluable to de Gaulle's cause but the lukewarm attitude of the Americans in 
particular was most definitely an unfortunate state of affairs 169. Also, it took de Gaulle until 1942 to 
understand the importance of American support. One can conclude that the Free French would not have 
survived without Allied support and facilities, but de Gaulle would also not have survived if he had been 
constantly viewed as a puppet of the Allies. This matches de Gaulle's theory. De Gaulle was eventually 
successful in using the British to join the Allies and to establish himself as independent leader of the French 
Resistance by November 1942. 
169 An example of this is the opinion ofWilliam L. Langer, Our Vichy Gamble (1947). 
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The Influence of the Resistance including the Communists on support for 
Gaullism 
This chapter will discuss the ways in which the metropolitan French Resistance influenced and affected 
support for the Free French movement in unoccupied France. Areas of interest include the beginning of 
resistance in the free zone, the early clash between de Gaulle and the Resistance, the Communist 
Resistance movement, Jean Moulin and his search for unity, the organisation of the Resistance between 
1940 and 1942 and the later relationship between de Gaulle and the resisters. 
After the defeat of France in 1940, small resistance movements sprang up all over France to continue 
the fight against the Nazis. The number of resistance fighters was very small in proportion to the total 
French population. Aidan Crawley believes that there were only ten thousand resisters until the last year of 
the war170 while Jean-Pierre Azema expresses the view that even though there were two hundred and 
twenty thousand official resisters, there were undoubtedly many more who waged their own war against the 
occupiers and regime 171 • Adding one hundred thousand dead resistance fighters to the official list, Robert 
0. Paxton states that around two per cent of the adult French population was involved in active resistance 
participation 172• Whatever the correct figure, it was an appreciable minority. 
People in the free zone did not join the resistance groups in the latter half of 1940 for many reasons. 
Many possible resisters could not believe the war was over and were stunned into submission. People felt 
that they had no hope for the future, a prerequisite for resistance activity. It was also very unclear that 
whether being anti-Nazi also meant that one opposed Vichy or supported their nationalism and 
independence. Confusion of interpretations and a diffusion of anger amongst the French population meant 
that people did not all decide to become resisters. The disarray in left-wing organisations and willingness of 
right-wing movements to support the Vichy Government led to small, disparate bands of exceptional 
individuals forming the first resistance organisations and becoming 'resistants de la premiere heure'. 
The ideologies of the Resistance movements were varied and differed in complexity. Many 
organisations have been described as being 'of the left' 173 . The working classes and left-wing elite found 
17° Crawley, De Gaulle, pp.l86-7. 
171 Azema, From Munich to the Liberation, p.l 03. 
172 Paxton, Vichy France, pp.294-5. 
173 PeterNovick, The Resistance versus Vichy: The Purge of Collaborators in Liberated France (London, 1968), p.IS. 
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opposition to authority more acceptable than right-wing businessmen and peasants. They also came to 
despise the right-wing Vichy regime for all its excesses and embarrassments. The working classes were the 
worst sufferers under the regime compared to some peasants and businessmen who profited from the new 
circumstances. On the other hand, it was not just a working-class experience as Colonel Remy confesses 
when he states that 'twice in two years [November 1940 and October 1942] two of the 'grands bourgeois' 
had been glad to help me and run mortal risks. And yet I have been complaining about that class!' 174 . It was 
also not just a left-wing experience. Men such as Georges Loustaunau-Lacau who were previous members 
of pre-war protofascist leagues such as the Cagoule became right-wing resisters fighting against the Vichy 
regime. 
There were some resisters who opposed de Gaulle because they thought that his right-wing views were 
similar to those ofVichy 175; the majority did not know his political tendencies and therefore were more 
unsure of his credentials. The Resistance movements were on the whole unsure about the direction that 
post-war France should take; they only assured themselves that a capitalist and decadent regime like the 
Third Republic and the Russian Communist model were both totally unsuitable. 
However, the Free French looked upon the struggle as one of national liberation, a matter of military 
and international importance. To the internal resisters, it was viewed only as a revolutionary and 
ideological struggle. The enemy of the resistance movements was not necessarily the same. For the 
socialists, it was the capitalist class, the trade unionists opposed the employers' yellow unions and states' 
corporatist unions, the old-style Dreyfusard republicans were against clericalism, injustice, censorship and 
anti-Semitism which were all part of the National Revolution, the local resisters fought against local 
collaborators, demonstrators found an enemy in the police, and hungry urban families were unhappy with 
Vichy's scarcity of food and the black market176• The Southern and Northern zones both had very different 
enemies. The southern resistance movements still largely paid allegiance to Petain and were also very 
sceptical about de Gaulle. They had various enemies, they were more 'attentiste', and they took only minor 
risks on the whole. The Resistance groupings in the North fought against the Nazis and were much more 
active. Their reaction to the German occupiers was much stronger and they paid very little allegiance to 
174 Colonel Remy, Courage and Fear (London, 1950; trans. Lancelot C. Sheppard), pp.l50-152. 
175 Les Informations Sociales: Bulletin d'lnformation (Juin- Juillet 1943, France) it !'usage des Militants Syndicalistes et des futurs 
cadres sociaux de la France liben:e No.!, p.6. 
176 Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p.230. 
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Petain. They also had more contact with the Free French and British intelligence services until 1942. They 
took grave risks as the penalty of resisting was more severe under the Nazis. For the Free French, their 
main enemies were the Vichy Government followed by the Germans. All of these different oppositions did 
not necessarily hinder Resistance groupings which emerged because of affinities of place, ideas, past and 
experience. 
The early resistance movements were not necessarily formed solely by outsiders; a view expressed by 
Emmanuel d' Astier177. In many cases, people looked to leaders of a particular group or community to show 
them the way. However, some of the leaders of the Resistance movements tended to be already in conflict 
with the society into which they were born before the war. They tended to be dissatisfied Communists and 
army officers, revolutionary priests, trade unionists and intellectuals. These men were at war with the status 
quo, men such as de Gaulle and Emmanuel d' As tier de la Vigerie 178 . Individuals from varying backgrounds 
and with various aims and objectives formed small groups fighting against the acceptance of the armistice, 
the German occupation, and sometimes against the Vichy regime. Each group had to put out its own 
propaganda, organise its own activities, and so on. The first 'reseaux' began with a few groups joining 
together and communicating via London radio but the vast majority of resistance movements were local, 
individual and secret. Many rivalries between groups thwarted any attempt of joining together to form 
larger groups. Many of the people who joined the Resistance were certain in their own mind and 
determined to follow their own convictions. They were also later viewed as being patriotic for resisting the 
Germans. However, the real reason for people resisting the enemy was specific to themselves. These may 
have included connections to England and America, personal experiences of the war, anti-authoritarianism 
and rebellious views, anti-Fascist opinion, and general optimism. These reasons were affected by family 
situations, locality, group membership, jobs and communications 179• Later resisters were usually angered by 
a specific event or experience that turned them against Vichy or the Germans. 
These individual viewpoints and basic organisations were not conducive to collectivity. The prevalence 
of inexperience and disarray within organisations would become a problem for the Free French who later 
wished to organise the southern Resistance movements along their lines. By supplying them with Free 
177 Emmanuel d'Astier referred to in Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p.76. 
176 Jonathan H. King, "Emmanuel d'Astier and the Nature ofthe French Resistance" in Journal of Contemporary History Volume 8 
No.4 (London and California, October 1973), ppJI-32. 
179 Ked ward, Resistance in Vichy France, pp. 79-80. 
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French funds and immersing them in Gaullist political thought, the Free French hoped that opinions would 
be changed. For this to occur, structure and organisation was paramount. 'The new resistance groups', 
according to Bidault, 'recruited members at random and were sometimes very careless. They effectively 
put an end to creating an independent Home Resistance' 180. The class system seemed to add to the 
instability of the Resistance groups. Colonel Passy believed that 'la petite bourgeoisie ... etaient, 
proportionellement, et dans !'ensemble, plus resistants, mais malgre tout tres divises' 181 ; the general feeling 
was that the movements as a whole were divided by class or politics and then amongst themselves. Their 
methods of recruitment were poor, they argued about the best way to utilise the scant resources they had 
acquired, their leaders had set up a power base which they were proud of and which they were unwilling to 
share with others for fear of usurpation or being informed upon, and they cherished their independence so 
much that they were unenthused by receiving orders from a higher authority, namely de Gaulle. The 
Resistance could never have been a homogeneous, tightly-knit group, since the very phenomenon known as 
the Resistance was developed between 1940 and 1942 in a plurality ofways 182. Taking away their 
independent thought would be Hke taking away the Free French's 'raison d'etre', something which the Free 
French did not consider at all. 
Other problems that the Free French initially encountered included the widespread support for Petain 
and his government within resistance movements. Many organisations such as Combat initially saw 
themselves as fighting secretly for Petain's struggle against the Nazis. Another factor was that de Gaulle 
was a comparatively unknown figure in France during the first year of the Vichy regime and even 
thereafter. Jean-Pierre Levy, a member ofFranc-Tireur, explains that in July 1940, 'je n'ai pas 
connaissance de l'appel du 18 juin 1940. Ce n'est qu'un peu plus tard que j'ai appris !'existence d'un 
general fran9ais - dont personne d' ailleurs ne connaissait le nom' 183 • Of those resisters who had heard of de 
Gaulle, a significant proportion were unsure about him and needed to know more about him before they 
could possibly support him. This was mainly due to the fact that de Gaulle had tried to rally Frenchmen in 
London and in the Empire but not actually from metropolitan France, and that they knew nothing of his 
political and personal intentions. Some resisters were pro-de Gaulle but they had no way of contacting him. 
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Georges Bidault states that he was attracted to de Gaulle's cause from the outset but had no way of getting 
in touch with the Free French to co-ordinate his actions with them 184. 
Up until at least the beginning of 1942, de Gaulle and the Free French frequently clashed with the 
metropolitan Resistance movements. Some resistance movements in France did not think that the Free 
French were true resisters because they had left French soil. According to Henri Frenay, there were quite a 
few resisters in the free zone who believed that Petain was the real resister. Some of his intelligence friends 
thought de Gaulle 'was a mere criminal, an overambitious general in the pay of the "foreigners" and the 
"Judeo-Masons'" 185• De Gaulle was lambasted for being an emigre and Petain was supported for his 
steadfastness in the face of defeat. All of these factors were influenced by Vichy propaganda and by 
resisters' commitments to avoid civil conflict and revolution. 
De Gaulle's assumption of leadership was not very popular with the majority of resisters; nor was his 
domineering and dictatorial attitude. 1 ean Boutron, a supporter of de Gaulle, admits that 'la tendance 
gaulliste, evidemment, est de rattacher a de Gaulle toutes les activites resistantes des Franr;:ais' 186. The Free 
French had already begun to perpetuate the latter day Gaullist resistancialist myth: - 'the Resistance equals 
de Gaulle; de Gaulle equals France; hence the Resistance equals France' 187. An excellent example of this is 
the radio speech that de Gaulle gave on 23 October 1941 to the French Resistance organisations. The issue 
of premature violence was always a matter of disagreement among the resisters dividing even the active 
resistance, but when de Gaulle deplored the assassinations of Germans for the waste of life of subsequent 
resisters and for the waste of time, he was supported by many but also condemned by many others. In the 
southern zone, he was disliked for his domineering attitude but was supported in what he said 188. Most 
people in the South believed in preparing for the future liberation of the country and for ousting the 
occupiers. De Gaulle's authority was very limited at this time and his speech was not followed as such 189; 
the people who supported what he said were the people who were already resisting by non-violent means. 
De Gaulle was unpopular with many resisters until later in the war when they were more assured of his 
success. One resister later said that 'even after 1942 there was no patriotic upsurge; that's a myth' but there 
184 Bidault, Resistance. pp.13-17. 
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was 'independent action without orders from the top and without a hard political line' 190• Others were very 
unhappy with the conduct of the Free French in London who they thought did not take the French 
Resistance seriously. Substantial aid and effective liaison did not materialise out ofCarlton Gardens until 
1942 and this was coerced by French resistance leaders. However, according to Gerald Maguire, it was 
often difficult for the Free French to contact resistance groups who were usually very isolated and the Free 
French Intelligence service was completely dependent on the British for resources such as transmitting 
messages, distributing weapons and so on which was resented by the Resistance 191 . On the other hand, 
Alexander Werth states that Free French intelligence failed in its attempt to develop large-scale resistance 
until the summer of 1942 192• However successful or unsuccessful the BCRA was in fulfilling its remit, it 
could not inspire wholehearted support for the Free French. De Gaulle mistrusted the interior resistance 
because he did not understand metropolitan French opinions, spending little time there; he found the 
resistance foreign to him and he despaired of the success of the relationship between the French and the 
British Intelligence services. After meeting de Gaulle several times in March 1942, Christian Pineau, a 
leading syndicalist, wrote that, 'he [de Gaulle] mentioned the Free French, the troops in Africa, as if they 
were the sole representatives of the French Resistance .... He put me not a single question about the 
Resistance, not a single question about my own activities' 193 • Links remained weak for these reasons. 
In 1940, Gaullism could have been recognised more as a state of mind than as an organised movement; 
the most popular method of support for Gaullism was simply tuning into the BBC radio service and not 
demonstrating in the street, organising reseaux and so on. The largest movements in the southern zone, 
Combat, Liberation and Liberte made only passing references to de Gaulle until 1942. During 1942, the 
southern resistance movements became more supportive of the Gaullists but there were ulterior motives 
behind their actions. Some resistance leaders, according to Henri Frenay, regarded de Gaulle as a useful 
'symbol' to use and discard as and when required; the leaders would retain complete liberty ofjudgment194. 
It was some movements' intentions to receive funds and equipment from the Free French but at the same 
time try to transform the Resistance into a strong non-Gaullist political force upon which to depend. This 
190 Mile. Madeleine Baudoin (6 September 1971, Marseilles) interview quoted in Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, pp.277-278. 
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unrealistic conclusion created a great deal of dissension. By November 1942, some resisters had accepted 
de Gaulle as an important leader of the Resistance but many believed that he should resign when liberation 
had been achieved. One fear which the resisters in France experienced was explained by Colonel Remy to 
Colonel Passy:- 'Ce que les vrais patriotes craignent le plus, c'est que la large pleaide des denonciations ne 
soit, le jour venu, au tout premier rang pour crier "Vive de Gaulle!" plus fort que les autres et ne livre ses 
compatriotes, en sens inverse, afin de se proteger contre de justes represailles,J95 . Another fear that the 
resisters harboured was the belief that de Gaulle was in favour of resurrecting the Third Republic. De 
Gaulle did not spell out his political ideas to the Resistance and by including old party members in the 
National Resistance Council, he made himself unpopular with them. 
The Communists were possibly viewed by the Free French as their greatest threat in resistance circles to 
the success of their movement in unoccupied France. The greatest problem with the Communists was that 
they were so unpredictable. At one point in time, the Free French would be despised but a policy change 
would reverse opinions and Communists would embrace the Free French with open arms. However, this 
unpredictability would benefit the Gaullists. For instance, police in Clermont-Ferrand considered the 
Communists as the main antagonists and the Gaullists as mere misguided patriots until an anti-Gaullist 
order was issued by Rene Bousquet in August 1942196. The Communists were also similar to other resisters 
in that each movement or group have been loosely grouped under the banner of 'Communists' whereas in 
reality their opinions and political ideas were very different from each other. This is best illustrated by the 
divergence of opinion during the first two years of the war when the official line was one of neutrality. As 
H.R. Ked ward puts it, after the armistice 'the Communists in the southern zone were anti-Vichy, both for 
its internal and external policies, anti-collaboration with Germany, anti-Petain, suspicious of de Gaulle and 
Britain, opposed to any further involvement in the imperialist war on any side, vigorous in their defence of 
French republican values, and as vehemently anti-capitalist as at any other time in their history' 197• The 
official line was followed by the majority, but there were large-scale defections from the party after their 
incomprehension of the Nazi-Soviet Pact of 1939. Some ofthe defectors supported de Gaulle but most 
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fought for their own anti-German cause. Men like Pierre Brossolette were a rare breed indeed198. The split 
in the French Communist Party made the Free French look more organised and structured but the 
subsequent official anti-de Gaulle propaganda did not help the Gaullists gain support. In L'Humanite on 29 
May 1941 one article read, 'Combattant les uns derriere de Gaulle, agent de la City, les autres derriere 
Darlan, valet de Berlin, des soldats Fran9ais sont conduites a la boucherie pour une cause qui n'est pas la 
leur' 199. In late June 1941, the Communist Party completely revised its policy following the outbreak of war 
between Russia and Germany. They officially supported the Russian, Free French and British causes as 
well as officially opposing Vichy and the Nazis. This influenced a large number of rank-and-file 
Communists to support the Free French. De Gaulle welcomed their support because they would provide 
extra support for his own movement and because they had been and still were worthy opponents. The 
Communists and Socialists now supported de Gaulle because his symbol was valued by the rank-and-file; 
because he received a commendation from Leon Blum; and was willing to work with Socialists by for 
instance including Andre Philip in the Free French Committee; and because to oppose de Gaulle would 
split the party and cause further internal strife. The Socialist resistance newspaper 'Liberer et Federer' 
stated on 14 July 1942, 'Nous nous rangeons aux cotes de la France Libre et de son chefle general de 
Gaulle qui est symbole vivant de la resistance fran9aise a l'envahisseur. ... Aux soldats de la France Libre 
comme a son chef, nous adressons ici notre hommage et notre salut fratemel' 200• 
However, their support was late in coming and when it came, there were conditions attached. The 
Socialist newspaper 'L'Insurge' explained that 'nous voulons conserver notre independance politique 
envers le Comite de Gaulle, ... et encore plus envers Giraud' 201 . According to Marc Boegner, M. Andre 
Philip said that de Gaulle would have to do what he was told202 . This independent streak mirrored de 
Gaulle's attitude; he would not compromise his authority by allowing the Communists to dictate to him and 
he viewed their co-operation as the perfect opportunity for him to control them. His two great advantages 
were that the French Communist Party had delayed entering the resistance and that he was a shrewd and 
198 Views and story of Pierre Brossolette, Socialist and pro-Gaullist from 1940, are quoted in Manchester Guardian 'De Gaulle's new 
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determined opponent who had been given more recognition from the Soviet Union than the Communist 
Party itself. 
De Gaulle's greatest asset within southern France was Jean Moulin, his personal emissary who was sent 
to France at first to unite the resistance movements in the free zone. Some resisters did not like Moulin, 
especially Henri Frenay who blamed Moulin for favouring the Communist resistance and having ulterior 
motives on that score. He also believed that Moulin played resistance movements off against each other to 
increase his own standing203 . Though this may be the case, there is no doubting Jean Moulin's success in 
France. De Gaulle sent him on a mission on I January 1942 to unite the southern resistance movements. 
With some modest funds and the assistance of some fellow Free French agents, he had set up a substantial 
'reseaux'. It was, however, mainly due to his personality, his determination and his negotiation skills that 
he became so successful. By April 1942, he had set up the 'Delegation Generale du General de Gaulle en 
France' which included a secret army, a propaganda office for the Free French and metropolitan resistance, 
and a committee preparing for post-war France. By the end of 1942, Moulin and a few other Free French 
agents including Pierre Brossolette had made it possible for the three largest southern resistance 
movements, Henri Frenay's Combat, Emmanuel d'Astier's Liberation, and Jean-Pierre Levy's Franc-Tireur 
to join together along with renascent political parties and unite under the new name of the Mouvements 
Unis de la Resistance (MUR). This new organisation also initiated links with northern resistance 
movements. De Gaulle had now attained powerful links to the interior resistance and his authority became 
real. His new trump card, that of being the man who had brought the resistance movements together, would 
be played to great effect until the end of the war and thereafter. Jean-Pierre Levy later wrote, 'La 
reconnaissance de l'autorite du General, en echange de subsider et de moyens materiels qui nous sont 
essentiels, pour la survie de nos mouvements, telle est en definitive l'alternative' 204• 
Overall, the Free French and de Gaulle grew in popularity with the Resistance in the unoccupied zone. 
There were a few examples of resisters still not knowing who de Gaulle really was in 1944205, but his 
authority and presence grew from the summer of 1942. In moral terms, the.Resistance was very important 
and to be viewed as the leader of the French Resistance was a definitive step for de Gaulle towards the 
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acknowledgement and support of the Fighting French in French public opinion. The French resistance 
newspapers also wrote what they thought of him. 'Le Populaire' stated that 'le general de Gaulle est le 
symbole nature! et necessaire de la resistance et de la liberation' 206 • Colonel Passy wrote that the Free 
French now had the means to link up with much smaller resistance movements and to work together against 
Vichy and the Nazis207 . By 1942, de Gaulle believed that he needed the support of the resistance in France 
to further his strategies with the British and Americans and gain more support in France. What he needed, 
according to Brossolette, was 'tangible and undeniable proof of the existence of Gaullism in France'; 
Brossolette asked Andre Philip to 'supply, publicly and visibly, ... a demonstration of the unreserved 
gaullism of the socialist masses' 208 . This proof was evident by the end of 1942. 
It is impossible to definitively determine how much the southern resistance movements influenced 
southern French public opinion during the first two years of the Second World War. It is impossible to 
understand the true nature of the resistance due to the lack of written evidence left behind. Furthermore, 
resisters memoirs are too often politically motivated. We can only surmise that the growing trend in 
popularity for de Gaulle within the southern resistance was mirrored in public opinion. The Resistance was 
r 
only an appreciable minority of the population but we can presume that as the war progressed, the 
Resistance movements were looked upon as being on the winning side; their influence grew and so did 
their numbers, and public opinion became more pro-resistant. De Gaulle was able to unite the Resistance 
under his leadership. The extra favourable propaganda that he subsequently received from the resistance 
was also of enormous benefit, and this 'coming together' also brought many different political factions 
under his 'control', including the Communists. Many of the resistance groups wanted to unite with others 
to further their own activities; de Gaulle provided the collective link. This link did not change many 
resisters' political opinions; it only made them loyal to de Gaulle and the Gaullists. The Gaullist 
resistancialist myth can be easily dismissed but it is very difficult to pinpoint the period when the majority 
of the metropolitan Resistance allied themselves with de Gaulle. It also depends on one's concept of the 
Resistance; whether the Resistance consisted only of active resisters or whether passive and armchair 
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resisters, or even 'attentistes ', were included in its members. Even though I believe in the former, I also 
believe that the influence of the Resistance on public opinion increased throughout the period 1940-1942, 
as did the Resistance's support for de Gaulle. 
66 
Public Opinion in Unoccupied France. 
Evidence gathered about Gaullist support in unoccupied France will enable us to test the hypothesis that 
Gaullist influence indeed grew to 1942 thanks to a variety of unanticipated factors. By studying the extent 
of support for Gaullism in unoccupied France between 1940 and 1942, we are able to understand how 
much effect the Vichy authorities had on people's opinions, how much influence the Resistance and de 
Gaulle attained during the first two years of the war, and how the early relative freedom of the people and 
threat of German occupation changed their perceptions of de Gaulle and the Free French. 
Even though most historians have looked at French opinion as a collective whole, their conclusions are 
nevertheless very useful for understanding opinions in unoccupied France. There have been many attempts 
to determine the extent ofGaullist support in metropolitan France during the war years. The 'sword and 
shield theory' which was further developed in Robert Aron's 1954 book 'The Vichy Regime' and 
supported by the 'petaino-gaulliste' Colonel Rem/09, was the first theory to come to any conclusion on this 
matter. This double game theory effectively halved the influence that de Gaulle was supposed to have 
achieved in France. By these accounts, he could not have succeeded without Petain. At about the same 
time, the Gaullist resistancialist myth gathered speed with memoirs from Colonel Passy and Jacques 
Soustelle adding weight to de Gaulle's contentions in his own memoirs that support for Gaullism was 
widespread at a very early date and increased towards the end of the war210. This theory was reinforced by 
historians such as Paul-Marie de la Gorce and Fran9ois Mauriac211 . Historians such as Pierre Laborie and 
Robert 0. Paxton effectively destroyed the theories that Vichy and de Gaulle were very popular during the 
Second World War212 . Robert 0. Paxton believes that 'the response to Gaullism was even less enthusiastic 
in 1941 and 1942 than it had been in 1940' because of de Gaulle's exile in London, Anglo-Gaullist exploits 
in the French Empire, and the British bombing and blockade during this time. Paxton believes that it was 
only from February 1943 that the French decisively turned against the Vichy regime and began supporting 
Gaullism in large numbers213 • Another recent historian, John F. Sweets, believes that the 'shift in French 
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public opinion away from Petain and Vichy to enthusiasm for de Gaulle ... was well under way by 1942' 
and that by November 1942, 'Gaullism had already achieved substantial support in France providing for 
most ofthe French an increasingly attractive alternative to the Vichy regime' 214 • To determine if any of 
these views are accurate and to reach a conclusion, we must conduct an evaluation of the general views of 
people living in unoccupied France including their opinions on de Gaulle and his movement. Information 
will be utilised from earlier chapters. 
Between 1940 and 1942, the people in unoccupied France experienced so many different emotions that 
it is almost impossible to offer any generalisations about their views and opinions. The types of emotions 
that they were experiencing were also very conflicting, resulting in a general sense of indecision and 
apathy, especially after the defeat of France in June 1940. This was due to a sense of premature French 
capitulation among some, due to a feeling of blaming oneself or France as a whole for the defeat215, and 
due to the ongoing policy of 'attentisme' which many French people adopted from the outsee 16• It seemed 
sensible to wait and see, but this became more and more of an issue when Vichy's active collaboration with 
the Nazis became more obvious and prevalent. This apathy and indecision did not really start to decline 
until1941 but it continued to prevail amongst some people at least until the end of the war. It all depended 
upon whether people were waiting to see what Vichy would do or were waiting to see what the Allies 
would do to assist in the liberation of France. The former would be perhaps disappointed from the summer 
of 1941 onwards and the latter may have waited until the Normandy landings before expressing their 
support for the Allies217• 
At the same time, the defeat of France led to the proliferation of ideas amongst some French people of 
the unoccupied zone regarding the regeneration of France. The newspaper 'Le Journal des Debats' 
expresses the view that 'tous ceux qui disposent de quelque influence sur !'esprit public' need to 'defmir les 
regles de la raison et de la politique qui permettront un renouveau de notre pays' 218 . The need for a new set 
of moral values was a reaction to the defeat and was a way of blaming the Third Republic for their 
downfall. What is not clear from the newspapers is whether these 'influential leaders' who were supposed 
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to save the country were members of the Vichy regime or part of the Free French Movement. What is 
almost certain is that their early hopes lay in the policies and actions of the Vichy Government. People in 
the southern zone were divided amongst themselves over the question of who was responsible for the 
defeat and by the terms of the Armistice; the majority were however convinced that the Third Republic's 
decadence led to the catastrophe and that the Armistice had been a wise move by Petain and his 
government. The idea of regeneration in 1940 would have to be modified in subsequent years. 
Following the defeat in 1940, the effects of the German war machine and the blockade and bombing by 
the British worsened the morale of the French in the unoccupied zone. It was further exacerbated by the 
loss or captivity of so many loved ones during and after the conflict. The Germans grabbed all the coal and 
petrol from the southern French whose industries had to depend on the Germans to survive. An initial 
unemployment problem in the south grew worse with the arrival of three hundred thousand refugees from 
the North. The partial British blockade in the Mediterranean was blamed for the sudden shortages of food 
and resources in the southern zone. The real reasons, the German occupation costs and demands, were 
something that the French public were ignorant about. When the RAF bombing raids began, people started 
to believe Vichy and German propaganda that the British were their real enemy. They thought that the 
British were revenging themselves for France's decision to capitulate. Morale did not really recover until 
much later in the war when the Allies were closer to victory and the Americans had entered the European 
conflict. Up until at least November 1942, morale remained very low. According to a report by a Dutch ex-
Vice Consul, 'Unoccupied France has become an inert mass. She thinks she has nothing but her security 
and personal comfort. Collective matters are only of secondary interest. Alcoholism and amorality have 
become general' 219• 
People in unoccupied France had one great fear - the occupation of their zone. This became an 
obsession. They wanted at all costs to retain their liberty. This brought them closer to the Vichy 
Government who seemed to act as a barrier to the Nazis. According to a Foreign Office Intelligence Report, 
'the French generally suffer their greatest anxiety from their fear of the unknown or unexpected. Known 
and experienced horrors are having less emotional effect and are better resisted and supported. This may 
explain why there is less evidence of anxiety (though much of real suffering) from the occupied zone than 
219 FO 371 31941 Z5233 'Morale in Unoccupied France' Report by ex-Vice Consul (whose lived in France for twenty-two years). 
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from the unoccupied zone. It also helps to explain why fear of occupation caused more anxiety than the 
experience itself 220• In 1940 and 1941, any notion of civil unrest, any change in circumstances which could 
threaten the 'status quo' of the present unoccupied zone's arrangements was seen as forbidden. 
Encouragement of the above was also out of the question. This situation became even more confusing 
because invariably the French people did not believe in what they saw or heard on their newsreels, 
newspapers and radio stations. They could not take the German propaganda and even Vichy propaganda 
seriously and this made them even more confused about what the Allies and de Gaulle's intentions were221 . 
In an attempt to black out what was going on in the war, the French people in the free zone 
subconsciously went about their business and became pre-occupied in mundane daily tasks. They found 
something else to do before thinking about their own future and the future of France. By keeping 
themselves to themselves, they made it much more difficult for resistance movements and collective action 
groups to bring people together. Opinion was very diverse due to the fact that people had not discussed 
their views with anyone else and until people felt greatly dissatisfied with the current situation, gossip 
became their staple diet. 
Up until the occupation of the southern zone, the people within it were divided by class and politics. 
Most people, as mentioned above, had lost all faith in the party political system due to the last Republican 
regime. As stated in an earlier chapter, the majority of people in southern France believed in a 
governmental regime headed by a strong leader with strong policies on the regeneration of France. Petain's 
popularity persisted, even though there were large contingents of left-wing supporters in the free zone. 
Politics was a dirty word in France at the time, as was social class. The social classes in unoccupied France 
were viewed as being divided on one simple but decisive matter: -'le petit peuple est pour la victoire 
anglaise, la soi-disant bonne societe est en faveur de la collaboration' 222• They were also divided over who 
should take over France and what sort of regime they should introduce. Lack of common interpretations 
and general confusion brought great benefits to the Vichy government. 
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Public opinion of Vichy was, as would be expected, varied and historians still disagree over the extent 
of Vichy support and when the support faded223 . What is almost certain is that for at least the first couple of 
months after the defeat of France, the creation ofPetain's new Vichy regime was popular and was seen as 
the saviour of French autonomy and French honour. The semblance of French independence and passive 
resistance which Vichy provided became the myth of Petain and the 'Etat Fran~ais'. Petain also represented 
the continuation of French national pride and people believed in this self-deception. The main reason for 
support in unoccupied France was that people believed that Petain alone had spared them the German 
occupation and that he had actively encouraged the promotion of national self-glorification during a period 
of deep national humiliation. The Armistice was viewed as an event that everyone should be grateful for 
because Petain had limited the German demands and had saved France from utter submission and even 
destruction. 
There are various examples of the popularity ofPetain in unoccupied France and these examples seem to 
suggest that Petain was popular at least up until the total occupation of France. A report by the Dutch ex-
Vice Consul suggests that in April 1942, before Laval's return, support for Petain made up seventy-five per 
cent of the southern French population224 • The armed forces were bound by their loyalty to a military 
superior and the officer class shared the same right-wing political convictions that Petain believed in. Pierre 
Laborie, the historian, believes that Petain remained so popular and de Gaulle so unpopular because people 
in France were little or badly informed225 . The Vichy regime rested on the popularity ofPetain and until 
Petain's prestige decreased, his government would be safe and de Gaulle's support in the free zone would 
be limited. 
There were mixed feelings on the subject of Vichy throughout the first two and a half years of 
occupation. According to Pierre Laborie, the majority of French people remained "attentistes" and therefore 
the government was not unpopular enough to spur them into action or to revolt against it in any great 
numbers226• The government was seen as an essential but temporary institution. They were attentistes out of 
laziness, out of fear, for solidarity with the resistants, and others became attentistes to wait for the 
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opportunity to actively join the Resistance. This attitude was also very unfavourable to the Free French who 
relied on Vichy's visible decrease in popularity to better their own international and metropolitan standing. 
The Vichy government was also widely regarded as a right-wing government and this divided the French 
from the outset. Supporters of Vichy came mainly from the army, the Church, and the countryside. 
According to a Foreign Office report in 1941, the upper classes were much more likely to support Petain if 
not Vichy227• The regime was popular with people who wanted a 'strong' government, those Catholics who 
thought the defeat was a punishment for their sins, those who wanted a new start, and the vast minority who 
wanted to collaborate with the Germans. This left a great proportion of the French population who de 
Gaulle could attract and bring over to his side. 
The point at which Petain and the Vichy government became unpopular has been a source of contention 
among historians for the past fifty years228 • There is no one turning point in Vichy history that marks the 
beginning of their downfall in the eyes of the French public. The frrst big mistake which Petain and his 
government made was the meeting between Hitler and Petain at Montoire. This proved later on to be a 
gross error of judgement as collaboration became very unpopular, but at the time, there was a mixed 
reaction because 'attentisme' was still popular. The Vichy government regained lost ground in December 
1940 by forcing the resignation ofPierre Lava! who was viewed as less than honourable. His replacement 
was Admiral Darlan who was a popular choice. By the spring of 1942, Darlan was very unpopular229 and he 
was replaced by the equally unpopular Lava! who guided the Vichy regime into a slow but steady decline 
which accelerated after the total occupation of France in 1942. The 'vent mauvais' which engulfed the 
Vichy regime from the start ofDarlan's reign was largely due to the extension of the war in the Balkans 
and North Africa, the capitulation of Greece, the intensification ofDarlan's collaborative initiatives, his 
famous 'Protocols of Paris' between himself and Germany, the battle between Vichy forces and 'la 
dissidence gaulliste' in Syria, the entry of Russia into the war, the multiplied constraints of daily life, the 
227 FO 371 28272 Z4763 MrNeville Butler to Mr. Mack (16/05/41):- 'France Forever Dossier from USA' (Information from France) 
in report of Mrs. Anne Holloway (16/04/41). 
228 Richard Griffiths, Marshal Petain (London, 1994), pp. 271-291 and Milton Dank, The French against the French: Collaboration and 
Resistance (London, 1974), pp. 61-4 believe that Montoire marked the death knell of the Vichy regime. Lacouture, De Gaulle: The 
Rebel, p.282 states that it was not untill941 that Vichy became unpopular. Aron, The Vichy Regime 1940-1944, pp. 368-9 believes 
that Vichy became unpopular from the summer of 1942 (the demonstrations marking a turning point). Paxton, Vichy France, p.241 ... 
expresses the view that the French population did not turn against the Vichy regime until February 1943 (according to French Prefet 
reports). 
229 FO 3 71 31939 Z2506 Lord Bessborough to Mr. Mack (24/03/42) 'Views of Pierre Huni on the situation in France'. 
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increase in rules, restrictions and prices, the ration crisis, the failure of the 'Revolution Nationale', and the 
increase in resistance and Gaullist activities against Vichy. When Lava! took over in April 1942, some 
thought he was the last chance to save France from German domination and was a more suitable alternative 
to Jacques Doriot230 . However, his speech of22 June 1942 left no unanswered questions after he stated that 
he believed in a German victory. From then on the decline became more rapid compared to before with the 
re-emergence of General Giraud as a new rival to Petain, the stronger and more professional de Gaulle 
movement, the introduction of the STO scheme, and the transportation of Jews to the East, not to mention 
the loss of more French empirical interests and the deterioration of Vichy's standing in international 
relations. By the spring of 1941, the popularity of Vichy was waning. Public opinion started increasingly to 
turn against the Vichy regime but still remained unsure about Petain. 
It was not a natural progression that de Gaulle would automatically gain the support that the Vichy 
regime had lost. In fact, the Vichy Government lost its support unsequentially. Its decline was not the same 
in each region of the free zone. This makes it very difficult to know when the regime was losing ground 
and how much of this support was being transferred over to the Gaullists. In general terms, the unoccupied 
zone owed more allegiance to Petain and his regime than the occupied zone. The population in the 
unoccupied zone was willing to give Petain, at least, the benefit of the doubt. He had saved them from 
many restrictions and many hardships. This slightly more relaxed society suffered from censorship but 
reaped other benefits such as allowing people to say what they think. Of course there were restrictions on 
this also but people could say what they believed and could create new organisations and even resistance 
movements without much trouble at first. People felt as if they could support an organisation that did not 
necessarily have to be pro-Vichy. In this atmosphere, support for Gaullism was relatively able to grow. 
In contrast, the sense of indecision and apathy that people in unoccupied France experienced made it 
very difficult for the Gaullists to gain substantial support. De Gaulle had no known philosophy, political 
ideals or policies on the renewal of France231 • He was a relatively unknown general whom people were 
naturally suspicious of for these reasons. Of the people who did know him, he was viewed by many as a 
cold, aloof and selfish man. Vice-Admiral Muselier states that, 'il semblait oublier que nos ennemis 
230 Marie-Therese Viaud, 'La Dordogne' in Azema and Bedarida (eds.) La Regime des Francais, p.547. 
231 FO 371 31939 Z2506 Lord Bessborough to Mr.Mack (24/03/42) 'Views of Pierre Huni, a Swiss businessman, on the situation in 
France'. 
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n'etaient pas des Franyais, il s'obstinait a ne pas comprendre qu'il fallait, avant tout, reconcilier les 
Fran9ais entre eux, et gagner a notre cause les egarees que la defaite avait eloignes du parti l'espoir de la 
liberte .... C'est ainsi que le mouvement des Fran9ais combattants, qui pretendait representer la France, fut 
dirige par un apprenti dictateur incompetent, pourvu de pouvoirs plus etendus que ceux des monarques les 
plus absolutistes' 232 • With morale low in the free zone and divisions of politics and social class further 
hampering collective action, early support for de Gaulle remained only on the fringes of society. Idealists 
were few and far between in the first year of the war and civil unrest, an expected side-effect from de 
Gaulle's policies, was very unpopular. 
According to Anne Laurens, de Gaulle's rivals had no idea what France was going through and they 
didn't understand the political aspects and implications as de Gaulle did233 • This point is rather contentious 
because de Gaulle, when living in France, had only resided in Paris. He had been abroad for long periods of 
time and his political experience was next to nothing. He had no idea what France was going through after 
the defeat and was very cautious to venture an opinion on the political arena because of, amongst other 
reasons, his inexperience in politics and his unfamiliarity with what his fellow Frenchmen would think of 
him. This made it harder for him to establish a bond between the southern French and himself because it 
led to a situation which caused a great deal of harm in the free zone. De Gaulle seemed to be disinterested 
in the people of metropolitan France and only became actively involved in trying to get in contact with 
them in 1942 and thereafter. De Gaulle had not put forward any plan for developing Gaullism in 
unoccupied France until 1942 because ofhis inexperience but also because oflogistics. He had, however, 
been very interested in the French people. This detachment from mainland France soured many possible 
relationships between Free French and French people in the southern zone. 
As mentioned in a previous chapter234, de Gaulle and the Free French were mainly unpopular and 
unknown until the Dakar fiasco in September 1940 when they became more unpopular. The effects of 
Vichy propaganda on letters from unoccupied France were clearly evident after the Dakar incident when 
one writer stated, 'all the English already regret what they have done to us under the orders of that dirty 
232 Muselier, De Gaulle contre le Gaullisme, p.391. Also refer to pp.392-3. De Gaulle's 'egotistical attitude' also referred to in Robert 
Mengin, No Laurels for de Gaulle (London, 1966; trans. Jay Alien), pp.69-128. 
233 Anne Laurens, Les Rivaux de Charles de Gaulle:- La bataille de la legitimite en France de 1940 a 1945 (Paris, 1977), p.61. 
234 op. cit., p.26-27. 
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traitor, de Gaulle' 235 . De Gaulle's early colonial gains were supposed to gain his movement a power base, a 
supplement to his Free French forces and popular support in France, but instead the southern French were 
angered by the fact that he had stolen parts of the glorious French Empire, an Empire that along with the 
French Navy was viewed as something to be proud of in a time of misery and despair. This anger and 
distrust towards de Gaulle did not fade away; his forces' participation in the Syrian conflict further 
hampered his cause. According to Mr. Pierre Dupuy in September 1941, the southern French 'are ready to 
approve their compatriots' [Free French] fighting against Germans and Italians but criticise them openly for 
their initiative in the French Colonies' and they asked why de Gaulle did not actively take part in the 
fighting himself236• False claims levelled at de Gaulle included that he was too left-wing, too right-wing, 
too Royalist, that he was a supporter of European Jewry and that his success would herald an era of 
religious persecution237. One popular view was that, 'a Free French leader's name should recall the ancient 
glory ofFrance' 238 and de Gaulle's name lacked these qualities. 
De Gaulle's movement may not have been very popular in 1940 but the people who would later 
volunteer to join his cause or another resistance movement were not all supporters of Vichy and 
collaboration at that time. A B.E.F. soldier describes one such possible resister:- 'I know that what I saw in 
her eyes [a French nurse] is the real, undying France, with her courage and culture, her pride and her gaiety, 
her love for the noble and the beautiful' 239• Hope had not been lost by all French people but these kinds of 
people were few and far between in unoccupied France. What did seem promising was that most of the 
people in unoccupied France did not believe in collaboration with the Germans240• They believed in the 
regeneration of France by their own means. They wanted to rediscover their own national identity by being 
given the chance to be independent again. They would never have settled for being a satellite of the 
235 FO 371 24314 Cll691 Postal Censorship Reports 'Unoccupied France' No.86 (15 November 1940):- 'Letter from La-Chapelle-
Pontenevaux'. Other similar examples in letters from Tangier, Vichy and Lyons. 
236 WO 193/182 Directorate ofMilitarv Operations 'France under the Vichy Government 26 October 1940- October 1942':-
'Telegram sent to Mr. Mackenzie (25 September 1941) by Mr. Pierre Dupuy, Canadian Charge d'Affaires at Vichy, on his return to 
London after his third mission to Vichy'. 
237 The left-wing and Royalist claims quoted in FO 371 28460 1941 France File No.792 Z7920 'Opinion in France of General de 
Gaulle' (15/09/41) Col. J.W. Carlisle (War Office) to Mr. Mack. The Jewish claim quoted in FO 371 28270 Z1969 'Situation in 
France' (report prepared by Free French Headquarters) (13/03/41) 'France from 15-28/02/41 '.The Religious persecution claim quoted 
from FO 371 28271 Z3102 BBC European Intelligence Section 'British Broadcasts to France and the conditions there' (11/41) Based 
on French, British and foreign press and BBC fan mail (11103/41 ). 
238 FO 371 31939 Z2506 Lord Bessborough to Mr.Mack (24/03/42) 'Views of Pierre Huni, a Swiss businessman, on the situation in 
France'. 
239 Daily Mirror (17 July 1940), p.9. 'She is the REAL France!' Account by a B.E.F. soldier. 
240 Daily Express (8 August 1941), p.2. 'Vain Little Traitors' by Michael Powers (French Editor escaped to New York). 
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German Empire. Honour and pride were too important to the French nation for them to give up all hope and 
become subservient to the Germans permanently. 
One of the benefits of the unoccupied zone, compared to the occupied zone, was that people could 
express themselves quite freely up until 1942 without fear of immediate arrest. In December 1941, Pierre-
Henri Teitgen was able to say, 'we wish for an American victory' 241 . Ideology and freedom of thought 
could develop quickly in the southern zone which greatly increased the possibility of large resistance 
movements gathering together to discuss matters of importance and allowed them to co-ordinate their 
actions freely. It also meant that public opinion reports from the unoccupied zone were perhaps more 
accurate due to this 'relative' freedom of speech. 
When the Americans and, to a lesser extent, the Russians entered the war, this gave the French people 
something to hope for. As mentioned in an earlier chapter242, they now felt as if the British might win and 
that it was probably more advantageous to support the Allies. The French had a very high opinion of the 
Americans and for once it looked doubtful whether the Axis powers would succeed at all. Furthermore, by 
the start of 1942, the French people had to admit that the British had been successful in thwarting the 
German offensive against them, despite everything. The success of Operation Torch and the Russians' 
brave defence at Stalingrad led to many people re-assessing where they stood and determining what they 
now stood for. The turn in the fortunes of war shifted popular opinion from Vichy to the Allies. 
As the French Resistance grew and became more of a collective entity, there were various shifts of 
opinion in southern France. As mentioned in the above chapter, their active support was unsubstantial but 
the passive support that they obtained increased from the summer of 1941 onwards when resistance 
activities became more prevalent. Their acts of heroism, their resolute determination and their self-
promoting propaganda popularised their cause somewhat. As their links and communication increased with 
the Free French movement, so de Gaulle could enjoy some of their popularity243 . His name was now 
synonymous with the French Resistance and through his own propaganda, through his agents and through 
his colonial gains, he was able to yield power over them and become the nominal 'head' of the Resistance. 
His new status empowered him with the conviction that he would now take over from Petain when 
241 Pierre-Henri Teitgen quoted in G. Bouladou, 'Contribution ill'etude de l'histoire de la Resistance dans le departement de I'Herault' 
(unpub. these 3e cycle, Montpellier, 1965), p.95 quoted in Kedward, Resistance in Vichy France, p.45. 
242 op. cit., p. 53. 
243 op. cit., p.65-66. 
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liberation beckoned. His confidence grew as did his support; the Resistance became more popular in the 
free zone towards the end of 1942 when young men left the towns and villages to escape Laval's S.T.O. 
scheme and join the 'Maquis' groups that were amassing in the hills and countryside. People were now 
more likely to be related to or friends with a resister. 
Increasingly, the people lost faith in Vichy in favour of the Resistance, including de Gaulle and the Free 
French. Many people were impressed with his new power base on French soil which bolstered his claim to 
legitimacy at Brazzaville in 1940. Politics was not popular between 1940 and 1942 and by revealing his 
political manifesto too early, de Gaulle would have threatened his chances of gaining support from a lot of 
factions and social classes in France. When de Gaulle introduced his political manifesto to the French 
people in July 1942, he was successful in gaining support because he had tried to please everyone. He was 
a synthesiser of ideas244 • 
Some people viewed de Gaulle as being unique in the sense that his Free French cause was out of the 
ordinary. It was the earliest known form of resistance and its military objectives had been clearly set out 
from day one. Free French propaganda emphasised this. De Gaulle also came to be perceived as more 
independent than was at first thought. His blatant public disagreements with his Allies led people to respect 
him for his uncompromising determination to liberate France and replace Vichy with a solely French 
administration. However, his connections with the British were so strong that as their support grew, so did 
his. He benefited from the turn in fortunes of the war because it looked as though he would be on the 
winning side. Part of the appeal ofGaullism was the double game myth which increased de Gaulle's 
popularity. One person wrote 'Petain, Weygand and de Gaulle are the hope of the future' 245• Even though 
this was the case, by September 1942 the double game theory was becoming unrealistic and people began 
to judge and support de Gaulle on his own merits. It is also evident that the Free French found it easier to 
gather support and co-ordinate activities in unoccupied France than in the occupied zone and this may have 
been due to the freer self-expression and freedom of movement in the southern zone. Henri Michel states 
that 'la France Libre ... representait !'opinion publique fran~aise en miniature' 246 . De Gaulle's new status as 
244 Charles G. Cogan, Charles de Gaulle: A Brief Biography with Documents (Boston and New York, 1996), pp.I00-101. 
245 FO 371 28270 Z2672 'Situation in France' British Library ofinformation (New York) to American Department. Conversation with 
a young soldier, demobilised from Bordeaux and recently arrived in the U.S. (11 March, 1941). Also refer to FO 371 28272 Z4654, 
Z4763 and Z5251, and FO 371 28268 Z714. 
246 Henri Michel, La Guerre de I'Ombre: la Resistance en Europe (Paris, 1970), p.325. 
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'head' of the Resistance and leader of 'la France Combattante' gave his movement an effective new image 
which appealed to the French public. He had come a long way since the dark days of the defeat and Mers-
el-Kebir tragedy. 
Public opinion began to identify nationalism with de Gaulle and the Free French. Although people in 
southern France did not really know who de Gaulle was, they knew that he was a nationalist: - he believed 
in France's future and wanted them to believe in it too. His uncompromising determination to liberate the 
French from German occupation and restore France to its former greatness was admired by the French 
people. 
There are various opinions, as detailed at the beginning of this chapter, on the extent of Gaullist support 
in unoccupied France. Even though there were less restrictions in the free zone, the people were also very 
pro-Petain and therefore were not as sympathetic to de Gaulle's cause as occupied people were. The 
constant fears of occupation and obtrusive daily pre-occupations made them unsupportive of de Gaulle's 
cause. It was only when America entered the war and the Allies looked like victors, when Vichy 
collaboration and Petain's ineffectiveness became more blatant, and when de Gaulle's movement and Free 
French agents became more evident on the mainland that the southern French population began to support 
de Gaulle and the Free French. There have been various estimates of how many people supported de Gaulle 
in the free zone, from seven per cent in 1942 to sixty-five per cent in 1941 247. These figures and other 
primary sources have to be taken lightly due to the fact that there are different defmitions of Gaullism; 
some sources claim that a Gaullist is someone who is simply anti-German248 . However, of the sources who 
describe Gaullists as supporters of de Gaulle and the Free French, their evidence seems to suggest that from 
1942, public opinion's support for de Gaulle became 'popular', especially after the renaming of the 
movement to 'la France Combattante', the brave defence by Free French forces at Bir-Hakeim and Laval's 
247 Refer to FO 371 31941 Z5233 'Morale in Unoccupied France' Report by Dutch ex-Vice Consul states that fifteen per cent are 
Gaullist, FO 371 28272 Z5024 Mr. Lloyd (Colonial Office) to Mr. Mack (12/06/41) 'Conditions in France: Recorded by M.Antier' 
states that eighty-five per cent of occupied France and sixty-five per cent of unoccupied France are pro-de Gaulle. Manchester 
Guardian (Manchester, 19 September 1942), p.6 M. V all in, a 'pro-Fascist', states, 'Ninety per cent of the French are in favour of de 
Gaulle'. FO 371 31942 1942 France File No.81 Z6266 Report by M. de Schrijver, Belgian Minister for Economic Affairs who 
escaped from France (31 July 1942) 'Conditions in the unoccupied zone' states that support in unoccupied France for Gaullism is no 
more than seven to eight per cent. 
248 FO 371 32027 Z7080 Lord Cranbome to Mr. Eden (11109/42) 'General de Gaulle' Views of Frenchman Comert. Refer to Thomas, 
Britain and Vichy, pp.l35-136. 
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blunder in his speech on the radio in July 1942249• This does not agree with the views of John F. Sweets and 
Robert 0. Paxton, nor the Gaullist resistancialists. This popular support still remained passive and was not 
unconditional; there would still be many hurdles to cross before de Gaulle triumphantly entered Paris in the 
summer of 1944. Before 1942, de Gaulle was unpopular because he did not seem to take metropolitan 
France seriously, yet southern French people began to support him. In late 1940, de Gaulle was 'a known 
and popular figure' but by 1942, he had become 'a potentialleader' 250 . 
249 Refer to FO 371 31942 Z6129 'Notes by W. Strang' (31 August 1942) and PREM 3/120/6:- P.M.42/184 Memorandum to P.M. by 
Anthony Eden (22/09/42):- Point 16. Some Vichy sources also state his popularity:- Remarques sur les manifestations du 14 Juillet 
1942, direction des Menees antinationales, V,AN,F7/14987 and le pnSfet regional de Marseilles stated in AD Bouches-du-Rhone, 
rapport no.l88, 22 Juillet 1942 and in AN/AJ 41125. All quoted in Cremieux-Brilhac, La France Libre, pp.223-224. 
25° First quote from FO 3 71 28268 Z 115 Letter from Sir Samuel Hoare (Madrid, 01/01/41 ). Views of a group of wounded British 
officers. Second quote from FO 3 71 31943 Z6816 From British Representative to Fighting French National Committee to Foreign 
Office (Mr. Rooker) (01109/42)- Views of Mr. Felix Gouin (he voted against Petain on 10 July 1940). 
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Conclusion 
The Soul of France:- 'To Charles de Gaulle' 
France the France we loved finds its expression in his name 
The France that grieves to see her children branded with the shame 
Of mute subjection, crushed into the ashes of defeat 
In this man we see the France that Hitler could not beat 
France has been betrayed by France; but there will surely be 
A day of wrath and of revenge for this foul treachery 
And though o'er her unhappy land the bitter years may roll 
France will wake to rediscover her own immortal soul 
By Patience Strong (17 July 1940)251 • 
This poem, written two weeks after the Mers-ei-Kebir incident, provides an inaccurate view of what 
French people were feeling. It is a poem set in the future. It could easily have been used in the post-war 
years to reinforce the myth of Gaullist resistancialism. In 1940, the reality was very different. People in 
unoccupied France at the time were unaware of de Gaulle's new movement except for the information they 
had received about the Mers-ei-Kebir incident and about his speeches. To determine whether the Mers-ei-
Kebir incident was as significant in 1942 as it was in 1940, this final chapter will compare the reasons for 
Charles de Gaulle's popularity and unpopularity and rate them against the effect of the Mers-ei-Kebir 
incident as well as determining whether the extent of his support was beyond his control or due to his own 
actions. 
Shortly after the defeat, de Gaulle travelled to London to set up a new movement to carry on the 
conflict in exile. His 'appel' of 18 June 1940 and subsequent speeches were very insignificant at the time. 
Hardly anyone listened to them and hardly anyone knew who de Gaulle was. These speeches would only 
251 Patience Strong quoted in Daily Mirror (17 July 1940), p.5. 
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become significant towards the end of the war when de Gaulle was hailed as the first resister of France. 
Some newspapers wrote extracts of the speeches in their columns but most ignored them. It was only when 
the Petain Government denounced his cause in the daily French newspapers that people in the unoccupied 
zone began to take notice of him. He was branded by the government as a lackey of the British. 
The Mers-el-Kebir incident was very significant at the time and is still significant to this day252 . People 
in southern France were not yet accustomed to Vichy propaganda and still believed a lot of what they read 
in the papers. As mentioned in the Mers-el-Kebir chapter, they became very anti-British and they 
associated de Gaulle with the British. The Free French Movement became unpopular because people 
started to believe that de Gaulle had advised the British on the action or had known about the 'planned' 
attack and had not forewarned the French Navy. It was overall a very depressing moment in de Gaulle's 
career. He felt like leaving England for Canada and giving up on the idea of the Free French movement. 
For many Frenchmen in the unoccupied zone, this was the first time that they had heard about de Gaulle. 
The first impressions of him that they gathered from news reports were not very positive, especially when 
his eighth of July speech condoned the British action at Oran. His movement would be tarred with the same 
brush for the next few years. The real significance of the Mers-el-Kebir incident was that it was the first 
time that the French public were 'formally introduced' to de Gaulle and what they heard, they did not like. 
The significance of the incident did not die away. The Vichy Government made sure that it was 
remembered every year on its anniversary and the same feelings about de Gaulle that the French public had 
experienced in July 1940 were felt again during various other incidents over the next two years. The only 
difference was that de Gaulle had played a part in these incidents and had not just been an onlooker as he 
was in July 1940. The Dakar fiasco of September 1940, the Syrian conflict in the summer of 1941, the 
various African colonial exploits and the invasion of St. Pierre-et-Miquelon were regarded as criminal acts 
by many French people. The people who believed in de Gaulle's cause and in an Allied victory were very 
positive about de Gaulle's actions abroad, but the influence ofMers-el-Kebir and Vichy propaganda had 
stuck and most people viewed these incidents as attempts by the British, with Gaullist assistance, to take 
over the French Empire. What made it worse was that de Gaulle and his movement were actively involved 
252 Reference to an incident in November 1999 when Winston Churchill's statue in Paris was vandalised with the words 'L'assassin de 
Mers-el-Kebir' daubed in blood-red paint across Churchill's face. Article '1,300 dead, their fleet blown to bits ... is this why the French 
still mistrust us?' by Alistair Home in Daily Mail (London, 27 November 1999), pp.44-45. 
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in all of these incidents. The only difference between Dakar and Mers-el-Kebir was that de Gaulle's so-
called treachery was half-expected when the Dakar fiasco occurred, whereas the Mers-el-Kebir incident 
had set the precedent. 
On the other hand, the conflict in Syria was slightly more influential because it greatly affected the 
people in the free zone. Some people who believed in the double game between Petain and de Gaulle had to 
re-evaluate the situation. Some people hailed de Gaulle's victory as a triumph for French freedom and the 
first step towards liberation. Others became aware of the levels that Vichy would stoop to collaborate with 
the Germans and became very unhappy with the present government. Many people agreed with the Vichy 
propagandists' line that de Gaulle was a traitor for fighting against and killing other Frenchmen, and for 
handing the Syrian territories over to the British. The greatest effect that Syria had on the people was to 
split them up. It probably did de Gaulle a favour in the long run by dispelling any notion of collaboration 
between Vichy and himself but it also drew clearly defmed lines between factions and groups which 
became irreconcilable. The people came to distrust Admiral Darlan and Pierre Lava! but also distrusted de 
Gaulle. 
Other actions and policies that de Gaulle undertook himself were not very significant to the southern 
French population. People seemed only to venture an opinion on matters which affected the French nation 
as a whole such as losing parts of the Empire to a renegade general. There is a lot of evidence to suggest 
that de Gaulle's speeches on the radio were not seen as very important by many people; only Resistance 
fighters took any real notice of them. The southern French definitely preferred to listen to the BBC for their 
news but many only listened to the French news and switched off before the Free French bulletin began. 
Many people did not take him seriously at first; the significance ofhis speeches, including his 'Appel', 
would not become apparent until the summer of 1942 when he first professed his new political manifesto. 
From then on, the Free French and Resistance propaganda played on the fact that de Gaulle had carried on 
the conflict at a time when Petain and his government gave up. This only became significant from the 
summer of 1942 onwards when more people were willing to listen to them with an open mind and became 
more and more important as D-Day approached in 1944. 
The people seemed disinterested in Free French internal affairs. De Gaulle's setting up of the Free 
French National Committee was widely ignored as were his subordinates in London. Most people in France 
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did not know who the members of the Free French were; this was partly due to the fact that de Gaulle had 
overshadowed all his comrades but also due to the people's general disinterest in them. Any plans that Free 
French ministers had for the future were seen as too hypothetical to take seriously. They were nonentities 
who meant nothing to the people in the free zone. One significant factor which emerged from Free French 
internal politics was that some people believed that some higher-ranking Free French officials such as 
Colonel Passy were members of the Cagoule, an extreme right-wing organisation, and this coloured their 
view of de Gaulle and his movement. Another factor was that due to the fact that they were unknowns, the 
people in the free zone could not trust people they did not know and therefore were suspicious of the Free 
French recruits. This is one reason why Petain was so popular; they trusted him because they had heard of 
him before. The Free French Movement also found that their resistance activities in unoccupied France did 
not amount to much and they were very insignificant in changing people's perceptions of their movement. 
People were either unaware of what actions they were taking or were disinterested in them, and there were 
not many people willing to work with them. 
There was only a small minority of people in the free zone who would participate in resistance 
activities. This was a problem for all the resistance movements. Their significance in Vichy France was 
negligible until 1942. They had few recruits, few resources and organisational deficiencies. They remained 
small out of choice or because they could not either find new recruits or risk venturing out to find recruits. 
They remained independent organisations with their own leaders, their own methods and their own 
ambitions. The Vichy Government was not worried by them; only from 1942 did they use force to try and 
quash resistance activities. The French Resistance only became a significant and positive factor for Gaullist 
support in unoccupied France towards the end of 1942. Groups had amalgamated and there were now larger 
organisations with more money and resources. These organisations joined up with the Free French and 
came to be collectively known, with occupied resistance movements, as the French Resistance. It was only 
when the Resistance grouped together that they were listened to and were respected by more people. They 
aided de Gaulle by supporting his movement and by agreeing that he was the head of the Resistance. Their 
support was invaluable to de Gaulle; this was especially true of the Communist Resistance who brought 
many left-wing supporters over to de Gaulle's side mostly through their propaganda. From October 1942 
onwards, the Resistance movements were recognised as a force to be reckoned with, as were the Free 
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French Resistance. De Gaulle would benefit more from their support in 1943 and 1944 than he had done 
during the first two years of the war. The Resistance remained on the fringes of society till then. 
A very influential factor from day one was the fortunes of war and the actions of the Allies. External 
events had an enormous impact on de Gaulle's popularity in France. The British made it very difficult for 
de Gaulle from the very start with their no-nonsense attitude. The British were linked synonymously with 
de Gaulle in 1940 and 1941 and when they did something which caused anxiety or anger in France, it 
affected de Gaulle's support. Some people supported de Gaulle because he had powerful allies and because 
the British were admired for holding out on their own against the Nazi oppressors; others branded him a 
traitor for working with the British who had 'deserted' the French at Dunkirk and for working with them 
against the 'legitimate' French state. When the Russians joined the British to fight against the Nazis, the 
only significant aspect of this decision for the Free French was the French Communist Party's official 
support for de Gaulle and Britain. Though this increased support for de Gaulle, the Russians' declaration of 
war on Germany did not change much for the Free French movement. A factor which was especially 
important was the American decision to enter the war on the Allies' side in December 1941 and the 
subsequent upturn in the fortunes of the Allies in the conflict. De Gaulle was now more widely respected 
because he was allied to the United States, Russia and Britain. The upturn in the fortunes of war for the 
Allies from 1942 was seen as yet another significant event. De Gaulle's cause gained more recognition 
when he was viewed as being on the winning side. These momentous events also put paid to the Vichy 
illusion of independence; they had used their friendship with the United States as proof of their 
independence of action. It also led to the decline in support for the Vichy Government who had been 
abandoned by the Americans and by 1942 were viewed as being on the Axis side, on the loser's side. 
Another influential factor was the Vichy collaboration and propaganda tactics which greatly influenced 
support for de Gaulle. At first, support was widespread for the Vichy Government, especially for Marshal 
Petain. This effectively excluded de Gaulle from the affections of the people in the unoccupied zone. When 
Vichy entered into a period of collaboration with Germany, most people thought that this would lead to an 
honourable peace for France. It was only as time went by that the more collaborative the Vichy regime 
became, the less support they maintained in southern France. The Free French could only be a legitimate 
movement because Vichy was immoral; as Vichy became more collaborationist, the Free French became 
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more legitimate253 • This was of great benefit to de Gaulle who became more and more popular as Vichy 
dug its own grave and people searched for an alternative to them. Vichy propaganda was very influential 
throughout this period. At first, their propaganda in speeches on the radio, on newsreels and in newspapers 
was effective because people were unaware that it was being used. Vichy felt threatened by de Gaulle and 
therefore targeted him in their propaganda. The insults and degradations that Vichy dished out to de Gaulle 
were not forgotten by the French people; many came to agree with Vichy. However, Vichy propaganda 
worked in de Gaulle's favour by 1942. As Vichy became more unpopular due to its collaborationist 
policies, it also lost much of its credibility and its propaganda was read or watched with much scepticism. 
People came to believe that what the Vichy government said was untrue; de Gaulle's movement benefited 
enormously from this conclusion. By 1942, the only Vichy stumbling block between de Gaulle and the 
French people was Petain, who was still regarded as the nation's leader. Through their policies, Vichy 
would set themselves a course for self-destruction. They would also unwittingly turn a successful anti-de 
Gaulle propaganda campaign into an equally successful pro-de Gaulle promotion scheme. They would 
make it easier and easier for de Gaulle to overtake them in the popularity stakes. 
To conclude, the most significant factors determining the support for Gaullism in unoccupied France 
were the Vichy collaboration and propaganda, and external events such as the actions of the British and the 
fortunes of war. The reason that these are more significant than the Mers-el-Kebir incident is because the 
latter incident's significance is bound up with them. Vichy propaganda bent the truth to make the southern 
French believe that de Gaulle had been involved in the Mers-ei-Kebir 'tragedy' and they made sure that the 
people were constantly reminded of it. They used the incident for their own ends and they were very 
effective. Furthermore, Mers-el-Kebir was an external event and it was perhaps due to the actions of the 
British that de Gaulle was placed in an impossible situation in which he had to take one side or the other. 
These two factors featured prominently in the effects of the incident but they were not the only reasons for 
the mainly negative effect that the incident had on de Gaulle and the Free French. People did not need 
Vichy propaganda to suspect that de Gaulle had a part to play in the incident; nor did they suspect him on 
the sole basis of the British being the main instigators. De Gaulle was unknown and so was his movement. 
People are naturally suspicious of strangers. 
253 Views ofRene Cassin quoted in Maguire, Anglo-American Policy towards the Free French, pp.4-5. 
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What was significant about Mers-el-Kebir was that it set a precedent. It was the first event used by the 
Vichy propagandists to colour French people's opinions of de Gaulle after his June 1940 speeches. It was 
the first external event to influence the Free French movement. It was the first significant event to affect 
support for de Gaulle in unoccupied France; it brought him his first real recognition but is also helped to 
shape French public opinion's views of him. Between 1940 and 1942, it was more significant than the 
views of the early resistance, the organisation and internal politics of the Free French movement and the 
speeches of de Gaulle. The Mers-el-Kebir incident, similar to the Dakar and Syrian campaigns, was less 
significant than the external fortunes of war and the Vichy propaganda because both these latter factors 
feature most prominently in the former incidents and campaigns. 
The Mers-el-Kebir incident, the Vichy collaboration and propaganda and the fortunes of war were all 
matters beyond de Gaulle's control. He was only able to respond to what had happened; for the most part, 
his own actions were much less significant than other actions and events which were out of his hands. The 
Mers-el-Kebir 'tragedy' mainly effected de Gaulle's support in a negative way. Vichy collaboration and 
propaganda and the fortunes of war were negative factors at first but by 1942, they started to work against 
Vichy and for the Free French. It was only after November 1942 that de Gaulle's own actions became more 
significant to the French people. These actions were judged by the French on their own merits and not 
through unreliable Vichy propaganda sources. 
This conclusion is not a reaction against de Gaulliana254. From the evidence gathered, it falls broadly 
into line with the views of Adrienne Hytier and Dorothy S. White and shares some similarities with Robert 
Mengin, though my conclusion only concerns the first two years of the war255 • My views become similar to 
de Gaulle's own views after November 1942. 
As stated in the last chapter, de Gaulle became popular from the summer of 1942 onwards. This support 
was partly gained by de Gaulle's own actions, by the Free French Movement and by his association with 
the Resistance. However, without Vichy's rejection of de Gaulle and its collaboration with Nazi Germany, 
Gaullism would not have become the phenomenon that it eventually came to be. De Gaulle would not have 
come to the attention of the French people without Vichy propaganda. His wartime career would also have 
254 op. cit., p.5. 
255 Hytier, Two Years of French Foreign Policy, pp.82-87, White, Seeds of Discord, p.99, and Mengin, No Laurels for de Gaulle, 
p.342. 
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been very different due to the fact that his main enemy, the Vichy regime, would not have existed. Vichy 
became an added 'raison d'etre' to the Gaullist Movement. Without British support, resources and 
propaganda, without the Americans' entry into the conflict, and without the Allied victories during the war, 
de Gaulle would have struggled to make an impact. He owed much of his success and failure in gaining 
support by 1942 to the Vichy regime and the Allies. There was not one single event which determined de 
Gaulle's popularity and unpopularity in Vichy France but a succession of internal and external events 
which became more favourable to him as time went by. 
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